

# PEACE AND OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

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# Abstract

This paper provides a detailed analysis of the use of development spending to *sustain peace* – conceptualised by the United Nations in 2016 as a holistic approach towards preventing the outbreak, escalation, continuation, and recurrence of conflict. It seeks to clarify the ‘peace’ dimension in the Humanitarian-Development-Peace (HDP) nexus, including with regards to what official development assistance (ODA) for peace constitutes. The analysis assesses the balance of total bilateral peace ODA from all official donors to all ODA-allocable countries, including to fragile and conflict-affected contexts, according to the most recently available 2021 data. This paper aims to inform policy discussions on existing ODA allocations for peacebuilding and conflict prevention, including where resources may not be commensurate with conflict risks. In doing so, this report will assist Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members to understand how and to what extent their assistance policies and funding decisions support objectives to sustain peace.

# Foreword

This paper is the first in a series of initiatives undertaken as part of the Development Assistance Committee's (DAC) dedicated workstream in its 2023-24 programme of work and budget (PWB) that aims to enhance the dialogue between peace and development communities. A lack of interaction and communication between them currently impedes progress towards operationalising the Humanitarian-Development-Peace (HDP) nexus and represents a key obstacle to development effectiveness in fragile and in conflict-affected contexts. A core objective of the workstream is to explore the interlinkages between peace and development, including how official development assistance (ODA) can better align with peace objectives.

The purpose of this work is thus three-fold: 1) enhance DAC members' awareness of what the 'peace' pillar of the HDP nexus entails; 2) identify trends in global peace ODA flows; and 3) strengthen DAC members understanding of how to work more coherently across the HDP nexus. The ways in which ODA is targeted will determine the extent to which ambitions across the HDP nexus are realised. While this paper does not seek to chart recommendations for increasing the effectiveness of peace ODA, it is nevertheless hoped that it will prompt reflection among donors about how their current peace financing priorities and volumes correspond to the context-specific needs of fragile and conflict-affected contexts.

The OECD classification of ODA for peace and conflict prevention used in this paper refers to six purpose codes from the OECD aid statistics database, the Creditor Reporting System (CRS), which are referred to as core peacebuilding activities (codes 152). In addition, twelve more purpose codes are included – which are referred to as secondary peacebuilding activities (codes 151) – based on their strong potential to contribute to peace objectives through their focus on core government functions or inclusive political processes. This classification of peace ODA, which encompasses in total eighteen purpose codes from the OECD CRS, is inspired by international policy discussions about peacebuilding and state building. ODA reported in these eighteen codes also contribute to development. ODA which is primarily about other purpose codes than these eighteen can also contribute to peace objectives, depending on the context and on the condition that they are deliberately designed for peacebuilding results.

The OECD presented the findings of this paper to the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) in July 2023 in the context of the OECD INCAF Dialogue on Development-Peace-Security series.

# Table of contents

Abstract	3
Foreword	4
Executive summary	7
1 Peace ODA taxonomy	9
1.1. What is peace official development assistance (ODA)?	9
1.2. Methodology	12
2 Trends in overall peace expenditure	14
2.1. Official development assistance (ODA) for peace – key trends	14
2.2. Official development assistance (ODA) for conflict prevention – key trends	19
3 Unpacking the sub-components of peace official development assistance	22
3.1. Security system management and reform (purpose code 15210)	22
3.2. Civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution (purpose code 15220)	24
3.3. Participation in international peacekeeping Operations (purpose code 15230)	26
3.4. Reintegration and small arms and light weapons control (purpose code 15240)	28
3.5. Removal of land mines and explosive remnants of war (purpose code 15250)	30
3.6. Child soldiers (prevention and demobilization) (purpose code 15261)	31
3.7. Public sector policy and administrative management (purpose code 15110)	33
3.8. Public finance management (PFM) (purpose code 15111)	35
3.9. Decentralisation and support to subnational government (purpose code 15112)	36
3.10. Anti-corruption organizations and institutions (purpose code 15113)	38
3.11. Legal and judicial development (purpose code 15130)	39
3.12. Democratic participation and civil society (purpose code 15150)	41
3.13. Legislatures and political parties (purpose code 15152)	43
3.14. Media and free flow of information (purpose code 15153)	45
3.15. Human Rights (purpose code 15160)	46
3.16. Women’s rights organizations and movements, and government institutions (purpose code 15170)	48
3.17. Ending violence against women and girls (purpose code 15180)	50
3.18. Facilitation of orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility (purpose code 15190)	52
References	55

## FIGURES

Figure 2.1. DAC members peace expenditure as a percentage of their total ODA (2012-2021)	15
Figure 2.2. Percentage distribution of DAC members' ODA to core and secondary peacebuilding activities for fragile contexts (2021)	16
Figure 2.3. Diverging and overlapping priority areas for DAC and non-DAC providers of peace ODA in fragile contexts (2021)	17
Figure 2.4. Top 20 fragile recipients of peace ODA (2021)	19
Figure 2.5. DAC members' ODA to conflict prevention as a share of total ODA in fragile contexts in 2021	20
Figure 2.6. DAC members' ODA to conflict prevention as % of total ODA to fragile contexts (2012 – 2021)	20
Figure 2.7. Top 20 recipients of ODA for conflict prevention (fragile contexts) (2021)	21
Figure 3.1. DAC members' contribution to security system management and reform as a share of their total peace ODA (2012 - 2021)	24
Figure 3.2. Official donors' contribution to civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution as a share of their total peace ODA (2012 - 2021)	26
Figure 3.3. DAC members' contribution to participation in international peacekeeping operations as a share of their total peace ODA (2012 - 2021)	28
Figure 3.4. Official donors' contribution to reintegration and SALW control as a share of their total peace ODA (2012 - 2021)	30
Figure 3.5. Official donors' contribution to removal of landmines and ERW as a share of their total peace ODA (2012 - 2021)	31
Figure 3.6. Official donors' contribution to child soldiers (prevention and demobilisation) as a share of their total peace ODA (2012 - 2021)	33
Figure 3.7. Official donors' ODA to public sector policy and administrative management as a share of their total peace ODA (2012 - 2021)	34
Figure 3.8. Official donors' ODA to public financial management as a share of their total peace ODA (2012 - 2021)	36
Figure 3.9. Official donors' ODA to decentralisation and support for subnational government as a share of their total peace ODA (2012 - 2021)	38
Figure 3.10. DAC members' contribution to anti-corruption organisations and institutions as a share of their total peace ODA (2012 - 2021)	39
Figure 3.11. DAC members' contribution to legal and judicial development as a share of their total peace ODA (2012 - 2021)	41
Figure 3.12. DAC members' contribution to democratic participation and civil society as a share of their total peace ODA (2012 - 2021)	43
Figure 3.13. DAC members' contribution to legislatures and political parties as a share of their total peace ODA (2012 - 2021)	44
Figure 3.14. DAC members' contribution to media and free flow of information as a share of their total peace ODA (2012 - 2021)	46
Figure 3.15. DAC members' contribution to human rights as a share of their total peace ODA (2012 - 2021)	48
Figure 3.16. Official donors' contribution to women's rights organisations as a share of their total peace ODA (2012 - 2021)	50
Figure 3.17. Official donors' contribution to ending violence against women and girls as a share of their total peace ODA (2012 - 2021)	52
Figure 3.18. Official donors' contribution to the facilitation of orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility as a share of their total peace ODA (2017 - 2021)	54

## TABLES

Table 1.1. ODA grouping in the OECD Creditor Reporting System (Code 152 and Code 151)	11
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## BOXES

Box 1.1. Overarching principles to guide ODA reporting on peace and security-related activities	10
Box 1.2. Challenges in measuring aid to conflict prevention, peace and security activities	13

# Executive summary

This paper is the first effort to comprehensively analyse recent trends in official development assistance (ODA) that is directed towards peacebuilding and conflict prevention objectives, including in fragile and in conflict-affected contexts, as well as the evolution of such financing over the past decade. The paper also shines light on how ODA can contribute to *sustaining peace* – a concept introduced by the United Nations as a holistic approach based on preventing the outbreak, escalation, continuation, and recurrence of conflict. Such clarification is an important step for donors wishing to monitor, measure and improve the effectiveness of their own investments in peace.

Without peace, humanitarian needs will not decrease, nor will development objectives be reached. Investing in the peace dimension of the Humanitarian-Development-Peace (HDP) nexus can be crucial for tackling the complex, multi-causal and constantly changing drivers of violence or fragility, enhancing local sources of resilience, and for solutions to and prevention of forced displacement. Such investment in peace can reduce the number of countries falling into chronic crises and provides more long-term solutions to crises. Ensuring the positive peace impact of such investments, however, requires deep contextual knowledge, conflict sensitivity, real-time political economy analysis and sufficient agility to respond to changing circumstances. Crucially, peace investments must also support inclusive national or local capacities for peacebuilding and prevention, including through joint programme development and implementation.

Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members' peace ODA in fragile contexts is decreasing. In 2021, their peace ODA amounted to 10.8% of their total ODA (or USD 5.27 billion) – a fifteen-year record low. The current historically low levels of peace financing do not appear to be commensurate with the mounting peacebuilding needs, with 2022 witnessing the largest number of violent conflicts since 1946. Investing in the global peacebuilding toolkit is not an issue exclusive to ODA, nor is there a fixed target for the volume or percentage of ODA that should be allocated towards peace. But peace ODA investments that are appropriately tailored to the context can positively shape pathways towards peace. Recent empirical research by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute finds, for example, that post-conflict countries that avoid conflict relapse receive a significantly higher share of peace ODA than post-conflict countries that relapse.

DAC members' ODA for conflict prevention, a subset of peace ODA, is also decreasing in fragile contexts. In 2021, their ODA for conflict prevention amounted to 3.8% of total ODA (USD 1.85 billion). This five-year record low investment in preventing crises is at odds with the volume of spending on reacting to some of the most acute symptoms of crises in developing countries in 2021 (USD 35.8 billion of humanitarian assistance and in-donor refugee costs). Given the proven cost-effectiveness of conflict prevention, there is a strong case for increasing the share of conflict prevention ODA in line with the 2019 OECD DAC Recommendation on the HDP nexus and the clear priority it affords to conflict prevention.

By contrast, DAC members' humanitarian spending in fragile contexts amounted to 27.7% of total ODA (USD 13.5 billion) in 2021 – a record high. This increase is likely explained by the fact that demand for humanitarian assistance has never been higher. There is already indication that Russia's aggression

against Ukraine has intensified these financing trends, with potential negative repercussions for the prioritisation of and funding for peacebuilding.

The reliance on a small number of donors to fund the bulk of peacebuilding activities makes global peacebuilding vulnerable to political volatility and attendant shifts in policy priorities and budgets. Peacebuilding financing is heavily dependent on the United States, the European Union and Germany. Together, these three donors provided almost 60% of DAC members' total peace spending in 2021. Moreover, multiple peace activities received over half of their financing from three or less providers. Though China is a significant non-DAC provider of development assistance, including for certain peace activities and in fragile contexts, it does not report its development finance, complicating any effort to assess its overall investment in peace.

DAC members do not appear to strongly differentiate between fragile and non-fragile contexts in their spending on peacebuilding activities. Specifically, for fourteen of the eighteen 'peace' purpose codes, there is less than a 2% difference in the portion of DAC members' total peace ODA allocated to developing countries versus fragile contexts. The main exception is for the purpose code 'civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution,' where fragile contexts receive a 6% higher share of peace ODA than developing countries.

If ODA is to successfully contribute to *sustaining peace*, donors must be more intentional when allocating it to recipient countries. When designing programmes, this intentionality requires clearly articulating peace objectives and realistic theories of change for peacebuilding and/or conflict prevention, and consistently integrating methods for evaluating the positive peace impact of such programmes. Intentionality also requires more deliberately tailoring peace ODA towards the unique characteristics and needs of different contexts. Peace ODA allocation and programming decisions should be based on hard evidence and strong analysis about what is feasible and most likely to be effective in such contexts. Finally, donors should keep realistic timeframes for their ambition to contribute to peace objectives, acknowledging that peacebuilding is a complex social and political process that can take a decade or more of sustained donor commitment.

# 1 Peace ODA taxonomy

## 1.1. What is peace official development assistance (ODA)?

The average level of global peacefulness has been declining for eleven of the past fourteen years (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2022<sup>[1]</sup>). Conflicts have become more protracted (Petrini, 2021<sup>[2]</sup>), more common and more deadly. 2022 witnessed the largest number of violent conflicts since 1946, including a record number of internationalised intrastate conflicts, and there was a significant increase in fatalities from state-based conflicts and one-sided violence (UN, 2022<sup>[3]</sup>; Davies, Pettersson and Öberg, 2023<sup>[4]</sup>; Obermeier and Rustad, 2023<sup>[5]</sup>). Against this backdrop, there is an urgency to finance peace and conflict prevention activities more effectively, sustainably and predictably, and in support of the United Nations (UN) *sustaining peace* agenda, which relates to activities focused on prevention of “the outbreak, escalation, continuation, and recurrence of conflict” (UN, 2016<sup>[6]</sup>; UN, 2016<sup>[7]</sup>). This urgency is underscored in the UN Secretary General’s New Agenda for Peace and the UN General Assembly Resolution on Peacebuilding Financing (UN, 2023, p. 14<sup>[8]</sup>; UN, 2022<sup>[9]</sup>). Such financing can reduce the drivers of humanitarian need, while protecting and consolidating the development gains achieved through broader aid investments, enabling progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals. Moreover, because violent conflict results in net global losses (de Groot et al., 2022<sup>[10]</sup>), financing solutions that support prospects for sustainable peace can contribute to reducing this global economic burden of conflict.

Peace financing includes ODA for peace and security-related activities, which is underpinned by key principles (Box 1.1). It also includes financing for certain activities in the security sector that are not eligible as ODA, as well as private development finance that contribute to peace objectives. This paper focuses specifically on the impact of peace ODA, which remains one of the larger sources of peace financing in fragile and in conflict-affected contexts. However, importantly, peace ODA is only one tool to be leveraged within the broader peacebuilding ecosystem; a wide range of actors – including those specialised in peacebuilding, security and diplomacy – also contribute in crucial and complementary ways.

### Box 1.1. Overarching principles to guide ODA reporting on peace and security-related activities

The OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) defines ODA as government aid that promotes and targets the economic development and welfare of developing countries. Thus, the reporting of peace and security-related activities is guided by the general statement that the main objective of ODA is the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries. ODA is not to be used as a vehicle to promote donors' security interests, so military aid and the channelling of ODA funds to the partner country's military is therefore not included. The financing of military equipment and services is also generally excluded from ODA, except in exceptional cases where military is used to deliver development services or humanitarian aid. For example, while most peacekeeping expenditures are excluded in line with the exclusion of military costs, some closely defined developmentally relevant activities within peacekeeping operations are included. Training military personnel is not ODA-eligible, nor any other assistance that strengthens the partner country's military and fighting capacity (except when undertaken under civilian oversight, with a clear developmental purpose for the benefit of civilians and is focused on a defined set of areas that include human rights and the rule of law).

Source: OECD (2016<sup>[11]</sup>), Development Assistance Committee High-Level Meeting Communique, <https://www.oecd.org/dac/DAC-HLM-Communique-2016.pdf>; OECD (2017<sup>[12]</sup>) ODA Casebook on Conflict, Peace and Security Activities, [https://one.oecd.org/document/DCD/DAC\(2017\)22/FINAL/en/pdf](https://one.oecd.org/document/DCD/DAC(2017)22/FINAL/en/pdf).

The humanitarian and development pillars of the HDP nexus are broadly well-understood concepts. However, there remains a lack of conceptual clarity about what the peace pillar entails. As noted by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), peace is a contested, complex, and evolving concept (Brusset and Gary Milante, 2022<sup>[13]</sup>). This lack of conceptual clarity is a particular challenge for operationalising the peace dimension of the HDP nexus, and a key obstacle to development effectiveness in fragile and in conflict-affected contexts. Measuring peace ODA is not straightforward since many development priorities contribute to peace. There is no agreed international system for measuring peace and security spending, resulting in several definitions of peace ODA. Different organisations define peace ODA as a category of development finance by gathering projects from a defined set of purposes.

The classification of peace ODA used in this paper refers to a subset of total ODA that can contribute to peace and conflict prevention objectives given their focus on basic safety and security, core government functions or inclusive political processes. Specifically, it refers to eighteen purpose codes from the OECD aid statistics database, the Creditor Reporting System (CRS)<sup>1</sup>, which fall under DAC Codes 151 and 152 – as shown in Table 1.1. This classification is drawn from the 2022 OECD States of Fragility report (OECD, 2022<sup>[14]</sup>) and the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) (2017<sup>[15]</sup>) report on the cost-effectiveness of peacebuilding. The IEP methodology for measuring peace investments limited its focus to three of five priority peacebuilding areas identified in 2009 in the Report of the UN Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the aftermath of conflict – basic safety and security, inclusive political processes, and core government functions (UN, 2009<sup>[16]</sup>).<sup>2</sup> It matched these priority areas with sixteen purpose codes from the OECD CRS and separated them into what it termed 'core' peacebuilding and 'secondary' peacebuilding activities. Differentiating between core and secondary peacebuilding activities was designed to help distinguish some

<sup>1</sup> The OECD CRS Aid Activities database provides information on individual aid activities and programmes reported by donors (e.g. research projects, training courses, cash transfers etc.). It also allows users to check 'where aid goes, what purposes it serves and what policies it aims to implement'.

<sup>2</sup> The priority areas that were not included in the IEP methodology relate to provision of basic services and economic revitalisation.

of the immediate activities related to maintaining security and those longer-term activities that support the building of institutions. (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2017, p. 10<sup>[15]</sup>)

In 2022, the OECD added two additional purpose codes to the sixteen purpose codes outlined in the IEP methodology given their relevance to contemporary approaches to peacebuilding. These two additional codes are ‘Ending violence against women and girls,’ and ‘Facilitation of orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility,’ which were adopted and subsequently implemented by the DAC in 2017 and 2018 respectively (OECD, 2017<sup>[17]</sup>; OECD, 2018<sup>[18]</sup>). Together, these eighteen purpose codes – which are distinguished between ‘core’ and ‘secondary’ peacebuilding activities – comprise peace ODA as analysed in this paper. Those CRS 152 purpose codes also make up the OECD’s classification of conflict prevention ODA.

**Table 1.1. ODA grouping in the OECD Creditor Reporting System (Code 152 and Code 151)**

DAC code	CRS code	Category description
<b>Core peacebuilding</b>		
152		<i>Basic safety and security / prevention</i>
	15210	Security system management and reform
	15220	Civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution
	15230	Participation in international peacekeeping operations
	15240	Reintegration and SALW control
	15250	Removal of land mines and explosive remnants of war
	15261	Child soldiers (prevention and demobilization)
<b>Secondary peacebuilding</b>		
151		<i>Core government functions</i>
	15110	Public sector policy and administrative management
	15111	Public financial management
	15112	Decentralisation and support to subnational government
		<i>Inclusive political processes</i>
	15113	Anti-corruption organisations and institutions
	15130	Legal and judicial development
	15150	Democratic participation and civil society
	15152	Legislatures and political parties
	15153	Media and free flow of information
	15160	Human rights
	15170	Women's rights organisations and movements, and government institutions
	15180	Ending violence against women and girls
	15190	Facilitation of orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility

Source: ODA is based on (OECD, 2022<sup>[19]</sup>), OECD Creditor Reporting System, <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=crs1>

Programmatic interventions in the eighteen purpose codes categories can support both negative peace – the absence of violence – and positive peace – the attitudes, institutions and structures that create and sustain peaceful societies (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2023, p. 4<sup>[20]</sup>). Allocating ODA to these purpose code categories also has utility at different phases of crisis, encompassing activities that can help to prevent, resolve and consolidate post-conflict peace, in line with the UN *sustaining peace* agenda. Ultimately, such investment can enhance resilience, social cohesion, and trust within societies – conditions on which stability, a strong social fabric and positive peace ultimately depends.

However, it should not be taken for granted that investments in development will inevitably address the drivers of conflict and automatically contribute to peacebuilding or conflict prevention (Desai, 2020<sup>[21]</sup>).

Intentional targeting and design for delivering peace results is required in order to monitor, measure and ultimately achieve such results. In this regard, there is a crucial difference between ‘core’ peacebuilding and ‘secondary’ peacebuilding: whereas core peacebuilding always includes an intentional design to support sustained peace as the primary objective, secondary peacebuilding consists of purpose codes that may or may not include peace as an objective. It is possible, for example, to support public financial management, democratic participation and civil society, or media and free flow of information, without integrating and delivering on peace objectives. As this report highlights, there is strong potential in these areas to support sustained peace. Whether such potential becomes reality depends on whether it is intentionally designed to deliver on context-specific peacebuilding or conflict prevention objectives.

Additionally, all ODA, especially in fragile and in conflict-affected contexts, needs to be conflict sensitive. Building and sustaining positive peace is a complex and inherently political process. Without careful attention to the specific context in which such interventions are conducted, including the underlying political settlements that shape incentives towards or against violence, peace financing can in fact contribute to reinforcing societal divisions and grievances, thereby complicating or even fuelling conflict dynamics (Zürcher, 2022<sup>[22]</sup>). Achieving the intended positive impact of investments in core and secondary peacebuilding activities therefore requires substantial contextual knowledge, political economy analysis, conflict sensitivity, inclusivity and sufficient agility to respond to changing circumstances (OECD, 2020<sup>[23]</sup>; World Bank, 2020<sup>[24]</sup>). Crucially, peace investments must also support inclusive national and local capacities for peacebuilding and prevention, including through joint programme development and implementation.

## 1.2. Methodology

The analysis of ODA in this paper seeks to assess the balance of peace financing from all official donors according to the most recently available 2021 data. For the purpose of this paper, official donors refer to the group of states and multilateral entities that report their ODA to the OECD CRS, including DAC members, non-DAC countries and multilateral organisations.<sup>3</sup> In cases where DAC members provide most funding to a given peace purpose code, the analysis focuses exclusively on the balance of financing from this subset of donors.

Peace ODA flows to all ODA-allocable countries are assessed because many of the purpose codes relate to conflict prevention, which is relevant not just for fragile contexts but also for other low- and middle-income countries. As underscored in the UN Secretary General’s New Agenda for Peace, prevention is a universal prerogative in today’s interlocking global risk environment, not an objective to pursue solely in fragile or in conflict-affected settings (UN, 2023, p. 19<sup>[8]</sup>).

The data covers disbursements from all official donors, but only includes bilateral ODA. Henceforth, any references to ODA refer to bilateral ODA. Unless otherwise stated, all aid statistics cited in this report are deflated to USD constant prices (2020) and represented in USD million disbursements. As noted in Box 1.2, the aid statistics are limited to funds that have the development and welfare of developing countries as their main objective and that are concessional in character. They are sourced from the OECD CRS, which provides the most comprehensive, valid, and internationally comparable dataset of ODA.

The methodology used to arrive at the figures in this report does not enable a perfect representation of funding for peace, given the challenges inherent in measuring aid to conflict prevention, peace and security

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<sup>3</sup> The list of DAC member countries is available at Development Assistance Committee (DAC) - OECD and non-DAC reporting countries can be found under Development finance of countries beyond the DAC - OECD. The latter includes: Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Cyprus, Estonia, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Malta, Monaco, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Turkey and United Arab Emirates.

activities outlined in Box 1.2. However, it does enable plausible ranged estimates of peace investments, providing a strong indication of donors' intent to support peacebuilding and conflict prevention through their development engagements in fragile and non-fragile contexts.

Due to limitations in scope, this paper does not seek to chart recommendations for enhancing the effectiveness of peace ODA to developing countries, including fragile and conflict-affected contexts. Nor does it permit an analysis of the obstacles faced by donors in mobilising more ODA for peace and conflict prevention. It is hoped, however, that it will spur further reflection and discussion among donors about how their current peace financing priorities and volumes correspond to the unique needs of fragile and conflict-affected contexts.

### **Box 1.2. Challenges in measuring aid to conflict prevention, peace and security activities**

The OECD CRS purpose codes capture, to a point, official development assistance (ODA) that specifically targets peacebuilding. One caveat is that OECD codes are only matched to one purpose. Yet many of the areas and some activities overlap and could be accurately categorised as contributing to more than one purpose. This means that certain codes may only capture a portion of the actual total contribution to sectoral programming. For example, ODA supporting relevant small arms and light weapons control (SALW)-related assistance is only recorded under purpose code 15240 ('reintegration and SALW control'), even though other 'core' peacebuilding activities – such as security sector reform or the removal of landmines – could also encompass SALW control activities. Additionally, the structure of the CRS database limits the way it can be used, in that not all activities that might contribute to conflict prevention or sustaining peace are included or labelled as such. Likewise, the existing codes are not nuanced enough to cover areas pertaining to violence prevention and for which data would be useful.

Source: OECD (2018<sup>[25]</sup>) States of Fragility 2018, <https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264302075-en>; Maletta (2020<sup>[26]</sup>), Mapping development assistance to small arms control: Why does it matter?, <https://oecd-development-matters.org/2020/11/02/mapping-development-assistance-to-small-arms-control-why-does-it-matter/>

## 2 Trends in overall peace expenditure

### 2.1. Official development assistance (ODA) for peace – key trends

#### ***Peace ODA (codes 152 and 151) is a fraction of total ODA and is at a 15-year record low***

Investments in peace and conflict prevention are steadily decreasing and represent a fraction of total ODA. In 2021, DAC members' spending on peace across all ODA-recipient countries fell to 9.6% of total ODA (USD 15.27 billion) – a 15-year record low in the share of overall ODA dedicated to peace. Additionally, DAC members' peace ODA in fragile contexts fell to 10.8% of their total ODA in 2021 (USD 5.27 billion) – a 15-year record low in both the volume and share of overall ODA dedicated to peace.

By contrast, humanitarian spending – which includes expenditures on assistance related to emergency response, reconstruction relief and rehabilitation, and disaster prevention and preparedness – is rapidly increasing. Between 2010 – 2020, total ODA increased by 54%, while humanitarian aid increased by 161%. In 2021, the total humanitarian aid provided by DAC members reached a record high of 15% of total ODA (USD 23.65 billion). DAC members' humanitarian ODA in fragile contexts also increased to a record high of 27.7% of total ODA (USD 13.5 billion). This increase is likely explained by the fact that demand for humanitarian assistance has never been higher (OCHA, 2022<sup>[27]</sup>).<sup>4</sup> Although OECD data availability on ODA flows limits the scope of this paper to 2021, there are already clear indicators that these financing trends have intensified since 2022. For example, Russia's aggression against Ukraine has created considerable pressures on reallocating development aid budgets in some countries, due to increases in humanitarian aid and in-donor refugee costs and emphasis on bolstering defence capabilities.<sup>5</sup> (Veron and Sheriff, 2022<sup>[28]</sup>; OECD, 2023<sup>[29]</sup>)

Investing in the global peacebuilding toolkit is not an issue exclusive to ODA, nor is there a fixed target for the volume or percentage of ODA that should be allocated towards peace. But these historically low levels of peace financing do not appear to correspond with the current mounting peacebuilding needs identified in Chapter 1. Moreover, peace ODA investments that are effectively tailored to the context can positively shape the trajectories of countries emerging from conflict. For example, recent empirical research by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reveals that post-conflict countries that have not relapsed into conflict received a significantly higher percentage of peace ODA than post-conflict countries that did relapse (Lilja and Milante, forthcoming<sup>[30]</sup>).<sup>6</sup>

<sup>4</sup> In 2022, 1 in 29 people worldwide needs humanitarian assistance and protection, which is an increase from 1 in 33 in 2020 and 1 in 45 in 2019.


<sup>5</sup> For example, preliminary OECD data shows that foreign aid on processing and hosting refugees within donor countries more than doubled between 2021 and 2022.

<sup>6</sup> In its measurement of peace ODA, the SIPRI study also uses the OECD CRS purpose codes 152 and 151.

### **Donors allocate broadly the same share of peace ODA (codes 151 and 152) to fragile contexts as they do to developing countries**

Fragile contexts are most vulnerable to the risk of conflict, and over one third of fragile contexts were affected by violent conflict in 2021 (OECD, 2022, p. 37<sup>[14]</sup>). Despite this heightened susceptibility to conflict, fragile contexts receive almost the same share of ODA for conflict prevention and peace objectives as do developing countries overall. Specifically, DAC members allocated 9.6% of their total ODA towards peace activities in all developing countries and 10.8% of total ODA to fragile contexts in 2021 (Figure 2.1). Official donors, which include multilateral actors, allocated 8.7% of total ODA to peace activities in all developing countries and 9.2% of total ODA towards peace activities in fragile contexts.

**Figure 2.1. DAC members peace expenditure as a percentage of their total ODA (2012-2021)**



Source: ODA is based on (OECD, 2022<sup>[19]</sup>), OECD Creditor Reporting System, <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=crs1>

### **With some exceptions, DAC members appear to make limited sectoral differentiations between fragile contexts and other developing countries**


DAC members concentrated their peace ODA in 2021 in the same categories of peacebuilding activities across developing country contexts irrespective of their fragility, indicating their priorities remain broadly the same in both fragile contexts and other developing countries. Moreover, DAC members often appear to make limited sectoral differentiations in terms of the share of their total ODA they allocate to each peace activity for fragile countries versus developing countries. For fourteen of the eighteen purpose codes, there is less than a 2% difference in the share of DAC members' total peace ODA allocated to fragile contexts versus developing countries.

One notable exception where DAC members do appear to strongly differentiate between fragile and other developing countries is 'civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution' activities (purpose code 15220), with DAC members allocating a significantly higher share of their total peace ODA towards this objective in fragile contexts than other developing countries (22.2% of all peace ODA for fragile contexts versus 16.2% of all peace ODA for developing countries). A smaller sectoral differentiation is also made for areas such as 'public sector policy and administrative management,' with DAC members allocating 10% of their peace ODA to this objective in fragile contexts, versus 13% for developing countries.

**Generally, core peacebuilding activities (codes 152) receive less funding from DAC members than do secondary peacebuilding activities (codes 151)**

Core peacebuilding activities tend to receive less attention from DAC members, with the notable exception of ‘civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution.’ Core peacebuilding activities received some of the smallest volumes of DAC members’ ODA, accounting together for only 27.3% of the total peace ODA for all developing countries, or 35.1% of the total peace ODA for fragile contexts in 2021 (Figure 2.2). It may be, however, that certain activities cost more than others by virtue of the type and number of activities they include. Nonetheless, it is striking, for example, that ‘demobilisation and prevention of child soldiers’, and ‘reintegration and small arms and light weapons control’ receive less than 1% of DAC members’ total peace ODA.

**Figure 2.2. Percentage distribution of DAC members’ ODA to core and secondary peacebuilding activities for fragile contexts (2021)**



Note: Core peacebuilding activities are indicated in orange, while secondary peacebuilding activities are in blue.

Source: ODA is based on (OECD, 2022<sup>[19]</sup>), OECD Creditor Reporting System, <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=crs1>

**Non-DAC providers are not prominent financers of peace through ODA**


Non-DAC providers are important providers of ODA to fragile contexts, but they are not major financers of peacebuilding activities through ODA (Marley, 2020, p. 22<sup>[31]</sup>). For example, in 2021, non-DAC providers allocated only 1.03% of their total ODA to objectives related to peacebuilding in fragile contexts – which contrasts with the 10.8% allocated by DAC donors. However, 1% may underestimate such assistance from non-DAC providers as the CRS does not capture contributions from all major non-DAC providers, such as China and India.

Despite non-DAC providers allocating marginal peace ODA, there is nevertheless an increasing number of such providers. For example, non-DAC donors allocating ODA to peace has increased from two providers in 2012 to a record sixteen in 2021, though this increase may be partly a result of improved reporting. The leading non-DAC providers of peace ODA to developing countries in 2021 for which CRS data is available were Kuwait, Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. While the latter three donors have consistently represented the top non-DAC peace ODA donors since 2017, Kuwait appears to

be a new and important non-DAC provider for peace activities. In 2021, it contributed the highest volume of peace ODA from non-DAC providers.

Additionally, the peace-related priorities of non-DAC providers for fragile contexts differed markedly from those of DAC members in 2021, except for a clear mutual priority in financing ‘civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution’ activities, and to a lesser extent ‘public sector policy and administrative management’ (Figure 2.3). Unlike DAC members, which target their peace ODA largely towards inclusive political processes and core government functions in fragile contexts, non-DAC providers appear to prioritise sectors within the “basic safety and security” category: removal of landmines and explosive remnants of war; civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution; and security system management and reform. These three purpose codes, together, received 85% of non-DAC providers ODA in 2021, showing a high degree of concentration in the allocation of their peace ODA.

**Figure 2.3. Diverging and overlapping priority areas for DAC and non-DAC providers of peace ODA in fragile contexts (2021)**



Note: Priority areas are based on the proportion of total peace ODA allocated to the respective purpose codes (151 and 152). The slightly smaller concentric circle for non-DAC providers denotes the fact that they allocate less peace ODA to fragile contexts than do DAC members.

Source: ODA is based on (OECD, 2022<sup>[19]</sup>), OECD Creditor Reporting System, <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=crs1>

### **Peace ODA (codes 152 and 151) is unevenly distributed and heavily dependent on a few major donors**

In 2021, DAC members’ peace ODA was heavily concentrated in Afghanistan and Iraq – marking the fifth consecutive year that they have together ranked as the top recipients of peace ODA. Between them, Afghanistan and Iraq account for more peace ODA than the next five largest recipients combined (Figure 2.4). Eleven of the top twenty recipients of peace ODA are in Africa<sup>7</sup> and 6 of the top 10 recipients

<sup>7</sup> These are Mali, Somalia, Sudan, Nigeria, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, Niger, Libya, Ethiopia, Kenya and Burkina Faso.

are extremely fragile contexts: Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

There is a major reliance on a small pool of large donors to fund the bulk of core and secondary peace activities (codes 152 and 151), which raises concern over the extent to which global peacebuilding is vulnerable to political volatility and shifts in policy priorities and budgets. In 2021, the United States, Germany and the EU together contributed almost 60% of DAC members' total peace ODA, which also broadly reflects the distribution of spending on total ODA. The United States allocated the most resources to peace (USD 2.94 billion) in outright terms in 2021, though this is the smallest volume of ODA it has contributed towards peace in almost two decades. The other top bilateral peace ODA providers in 2021 are Germany (which allocated USD 2.9 billion) and the European Union (USD 2.8 billion). Over the past decade there has been little variation in the top 5 DAC donors for peace. Moreover, 2 of these 3 donors accounted for more than half of global spending across multiple peace activities in 2021. Though China is a significant non-DAC provider of development assistance, including for certain peace activities<sup>8</sup> and in fragile contexts (Hoeffler and Justino, 2023, p. 9<sub>[32]</sub>),<sup>9</sup> it does not report its development finance, complicating any effort to assess its overall investment in peace.

Amongst all official donors, the World Bank's International Development Association (IDA) retains a top position, contributing USD 2.5 billion or 13% of global spending on peace ODA in 2021. In proportional terms, among DAC donors, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Denmark contributed the largest share of their development budgets towards peace ODA (at 25.7%, 22.4% and 19.3%, respectively).

At the same time, and as for development co-operation more broadly, there has been a steady increase in the number of donors funding peace-related activities – although many of them only contributed small amounts of funding.<sup>10</sup> The number of official providers of peace ODA progressively increased from 58 donors in 2016 to a peak of 75 donors in 2021, suggesting more opportunities and pathways for sustaining funding for peacebuilding. However, as the marketplace of actors becomes more crowded, it is important that donors pursue coherent and complementary ways of financing these peace priorities, to minimise the potential high transaction costs for partner countries arising from multiple unco-ordinated donor investments (OECD, 2003<sub>[33]</sub>).


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<sup>8</sup> In 2020-21, China provided the second highest assessed contribution to UN Peacekeeping operations after the United States.

<sup>9</sup> Recent studies highlight that the largest share of Chinese aid in 2016 and 2017 went to fragile countries (almost 60 per cent in 2017).

<sup>10</sup> For example, the number of official donors supporting reintegration and small arms and light weapons control increased to 23 in 2021, but more than two thirds of the donors allocated less than USD 1 million in 2021, and most of these programmes were under USD 300,000.

Figure 2.4. Top 20 fragile recipients of peace ODA (2021)



Note: Syria refers to the Syrian Arab Republic, DRC refers to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, PNG refers to Papua New Guinea.  
 Source: ODA is based on (OECD, 2022<sup>[19]</sup>), OECD Creditor Reporting System, <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=crs1>

## 2.2. Official development assistance (ODA) for conflict prevention – key trends


### ***Spending on conflict prevention (code 152) in fragile contexts is at a five-year record low***

The OECD considers a risk and resilience approach as the conceptual foundation of conflict prevention, since violent conflict and fragility emerge from the complex interaction of sources of risk and resilience (Desai, 2020<sup>[21]</sup>). As highlighted in Chapter 1, the OECD classification of conflict prevention ODA refers to those activities listed under code 152 in the CRS database. Global investment in conflict prevention has not grown significantly since world leaders signed up in 2017 to support the United Nations Secretary General’s pledge to make prevention the priority. In fact, since 2019, DAC members’ ODA for conflict prevention in fragile contexts has decreased each year in volume and as a share of total ODA (Figure 2.6).

In 2021, DAC members allocated USD 1.85 billion towards conflict prevention in fragile contexts – amounting to only 3.8% of DAC members’ total ODA for such contexts (Figure 2.5). This is a five-year record low in volume and a six-year record low as a share of total ODA allocated towards conflict prevention in such contexts. The scale of such investment in preventing crises appears inadequate when compared to the USD 35.8 billion that DAC members’ spent on reacting to symptoms of crisis in 2021.<sup>11</sup> The disparity between investments in prevention relative to response is also notable given the well-established case for the cost-effectiveness of conflict prevention (Mueller, 2017<sup>[34]</sup>; UN/World Bank, 2018<sup>[35]</sup>), and the 2019 DAC Recommendation on the HDP nexus, which calls for ‘prevention always’ (OECD/LEGAL/5019<sup>[36]</sup>).


<sup>11</sup> This figure includes the amount spent by DAC members on humanitarian aid (USD 23.65 billion) and on global in donor refugee costs (USD 12.17 billion) for developing countries.

**Figure 2.5. DAC members' ODA to conflict prevention as a share of total ODA in fragile contexts in 2021**



Source: ODA is based on (OECD, 2022<sup>[19]</sup>), OECD Creditor Reporting System, <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=crs1>

**Figure 2.6. DAC members' ODA to conflict prevention as % of total ODA to fragile contexts (2012 – 2021)**



Source: ODA is based on (OECD, 2022<sup>[19]</sup>), OECD Creditor Reporting System, <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=crs1>


Germany, the United States and the European Union (EU) are also the leading DAC members for financing conflict prevention activities in 2021 (allocating USD 976.1 million, USD 961.6 million and USD 835 million, respectively). Other key contributing DAC members include the United Kingdom (USD 355 million), Sweden (USD 196 million), Norway (USD 143 million) and the Netherlands (USD 139 million). Several multilateral actors represent important donors for prevention, including the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) and the World Bank's International Development Association (IDA).

***Conflict prevention ODA (code 152) is targeted at extremely fragile contexts but unevenly distributed***

Extremely fragile contexts are the primary recipients of global spending on conflict prevention in 2021. Within the top 20 recipients of ODA for conflict prevention, nine are extremely fragile: Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, Syria, Somalia, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Yemen and the Central African Republic (Figure 2.7). Moreover, the six fragile contexts that received the most conflict prevention ODA in 2021 (over USD 100 million) – Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, Mali, Syria and Somalia – all experienced severe or high degrees of fragility in the security dimension of the OECD fragility framework (OECD, 2022<sup>[14]</sup>). Afghanistan and Iraq, together, received a higher volume of conflict prevention ODA than the next four recipients combined. Other extremely fragile contexts received comparatively small volumes of

ODA for conflict prevention (such as Burundi, Chad and Haiti), while others received none at all (such as Eritrea and Equatorial Guinea).

**Figure 2.7. Top 20 recipients of ODA for conflict prevention (fragile contexts) (2021)**



Note: The 2022 OECD *States of Fragility* Report classifies the countries in orange as extremely fragile and those in blue as fragile.

Syria refers to the Syrian Arab Republic, DRC refers to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, CAR refers to the Central African Republic and Lao PDR refers to Lao People's Democratic Party.

Source: Conflict Prevention ODA is based on (OECD, 2022<sup>[19]</sup>), OECD Creditor Reporting System,

<https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=crs1>

### ***Five of the top recipients of conflict prevention ODA (code 152) also host UN missions***

5 of the top twenty fragile contexts receiving ODA for conflict prevention in 2021 host a UN peacekeeping operation – these are Sudan, Mali, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Central African Republic. The need for programmatic funding increases when a multidimensional peacekeeping mission approaches drawdown (UN, 2020, p. 18<sup>[37]</sup>) and there is a statistically higher risk of conflict relapse in countries that were previously affected by violent conflict. This raises the question around how the conflict prevention and transition financing needs of these countries will be met in the current context of increasing and more complex UN peacekeeping transitions. Maintaining financing for peace programming is important following the withdrawal of UN peacekeeping operations in order to safeguard the peace and development gains achieved and avoid backsliding. The Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) is one such financing option based on its role in the provision of catalytic funding for prevention and peacebuilding and its investment priority focus on facilitating UN peacekeeping transitions.

# 3 Unpacking the sub-components of peace official development assistance

This chapter unpacks the sub-components of peace official development assistance (ODA), specifically what lies within the eighteen CRS purpose codes, to strengthen understanding of how these activities contribute to peace. Each section of the chapter also analyses the spending flows to these sub-components of peace ODA. As noted in chapter 1, the purpose codes can be separated into core and secondary peacebuilding activities. Core peacebuilding activities refer to basic safety and security activities (CRS codes 152) and are detailed in sections 3.1 – 3.6. These purpose codes, together, constitute ODA for conflict prevention, a subset of peace ODA. Secondary peacebuilding activities refer to activities associated with inclusive political processes and core government functions (CRS codes 151) and are detailed in sections 3.7 – 3.18.

## 3.1. Security system management and reform (purpose code 15210)

This purpose code comprises technical co-operation to parliament, government ministries, law enforcement agencies and the judiciary – to assist review and reform of the security system to improve good governance and civilian oversight. Eligible assistance is limited to civilian competence/capacity building and strategic planning/advice activities that promote political, institutional, and financial transparency, accountability, civilian oversight, as well as respect for human rights and inclusive, gender-sensitive security institutions. It also includes assistance to civil society to enhance their competency and capacity to scrutinise the security system so that it is managed in accordance with democratic norms and principles of accountability, transparency, and democratic governance.

Other ODA-eligible activities within this purpose code are those that aim to improve management of security expenditure. This includes technical co-operation to transparency, accountability, civilian oversight and democratic control of budgeting, accountability, and auditing of security expenditure, including military budgets, as part of a public expenditure management programme.

Security sector assistance (SSA) activities (including transfers of military materiel, combat training, joint exercises, and military education for foreign military officers) are not eligible for ODA, though in practice they can be aligned with SSR.

### ***What contribution to peace?***

Security system management and reform – also commonly referred to as security sector governance and reform (SSG/R) is a core component of sustaining peace. Well-functioning security sector institutions can enable economic development, societal cohesion, and political settlement by creating space for renewal

and investment across the socio-economic spectrum (UN/World Bank, 2018, p. 161<sup>[35]</sup>). United Nations Security Council Resolution 2553 further recognised the importance of security sector reform for sustained peace outcomes. It emphasized that a representative, responsive, efficient, effective, professional, and accountable security sector without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law is the cornerstone of peace and sustainable development, and is important for conflict prevention, peacebuilding and sustaining peace (UN, 2020<sup>[38]</sup>).

Establishing effective and accountable security and justice frameworks strengthens the basis for human security and can address perceptions of exclusion that can lead to grievances and fuel violent conflict. An accountable security sector that is responsive to the needs of the population can also strengthen the social fabric and build social cohesion. Additionally, programmatic support by SSG/R international partners to financial and performance reviews of the security sector is critical for sustaining peace. For example, ensuring national military officers are paid sufficient salaries can mitigate against the risk that they resort to embezzlement and extortion when deployed to combat zones. As such, security expenditure management reforms can result in increased accountability, greater transparency, enhanced capacities through efficiencies, and ultimately better security and justice for populations.

Finally, SSG/R can be vital during transition-to-peace periods, during which the implementation of peace agreements are often contested. SSG/R – particularly in conjunction with SSA – is therefore commonly connected to post-conflict state-building, recovery, and reconstruction agendas. This includes stabilisation and peace operations, notably the drawdown of peacekeeping missions. Sustaining peace through transition periods requires national stakeholders to develop and implement fiscally sustainable reform strategies and to secure funding beyond the life span of a peace operation (UN, 2023<sup>[39]</sup>).

However, security sector reform is more than a purely technical exercise – it is an inherently political process that should be underpinned by a sound understanding of the social and political peace conditions that security and justice reform require (Bennet et al., 2022, p. 12<sup>[40]</sup>). Relatedly, developing, maintaining and reinforcing political dialogue are deemed essential for effective SSR processes. Moreover, it is important to ensure that geopolitical competition does not result in a supply-driven approach to capacity building that fails to incorporate as its primary focus the long-term interests of partners, multilateral coordination and local ownership (DCAF ISSAT, 2023, p. 15<sup>[41]</sup>).

## **Trends**


ODA-eligible funding for security sector management and reform remains a largely untapped source of external financing for this objective. As remaining “insufficient to start bridging the fundings gaps in conflict-affected States” (UN, 2022<sup>[42]</sup>). Between 2015 and 2020, ODA to SSR/G as a share of DAC members total peace ODA steadily decreased (Figure 3.1). In 2021, DAC members allocated USD 898 million in ODA to security system management and reform. This volume amounts to 5.9% of their total peace ODA, equating to only 0.6% of total ODA. DAC members allocated USD 317 million in ODA to this objective for fragile contexts in 2021. It should be noted that actual volumes spent on SSG/R may be higher given that additional purpose codes also capture activities that have clear implications for SSG/R, related to justice (legal and judicial development), participation in international peacekeeping, human rights, and violence against women and girls, among others.

ODA for security system management and reform has long been associated with three main providers: the United States, the United Kingdom, and EU institutions. In 2012, for example, these three donors contributed to more than two thirds of ODA for SSR. In 2021, these donors retain their positions: the United States contributes 49% of DAC members total ODA to SSR (USD 440 million), the EU contributes 18.3% (USD 165 million) and the United Kingdom contributes 11.3%. Japan and Germany are now additional prominent donors for SSR activities (allocating 10.2% and 4.9% respectively of DAC members’ total spending on the objective).

Three multilateral actors featured within the top 10 official donors for security system management and reform in 2021: the EU, OSCE and the UN Peacebuilding Fund. Together, these multilateral actors account for 20.4% of all funding allocated by official donors in 2021.

The extent to which DAC members prioritise support to SSG/R within their own policies can be gauged by identifying the providers that allocate the largest portion of their own peace ODA to the objective. They include Portugal, which allocated the highest portion of its peace ODA to SSG/R (37.8%), followed by Japan (34.1%), the United States (15%) and Slovenia (14.7%).

**Figure 3.1. DAC members' contribution to security system management and reform as a share of their total peace ODA (2012 - 2021)**



Source: ODA is based on (OECD, 2022<sup>[19]</sup>), OECD Creditor Reporting System, <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=crs1>

### 3.2. Civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution (purpose code 15220)

This purpose code covers support for civilian activities related to peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution, including capacity building, monitoring, dialogue and information exchange. The category includes bilateral participation in international civilian peace missions such as those conducted by the United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (UNDPPA) or the European Union (European Security and Defence Policy), and contributions to civilian peace funds or commissions (such as the UN Peacebuilding Commission). The contributions can be financial or in kind, including in the form of provision of equipment or civilian or military personnel (such as for training civilians). Direct assistance to the defence ministry or the armed forces is excluded.

#### ***What contribution to peace?***

This purpose code covers a broad swathe of civilian activities of which the primary objective is to support peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution; its contribution to peace therefore requires little elucidation. Core to civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution are efforts to address drivers of conflict and fragility and enhance sources of community-level resilience, including through fostering social cohesion. For example, there is strong evidence that support for dialogue and mediation between national governments and civil society, between armed groups and different segments of the population,

and between communities in need, can improve inter-group social cohesion as well as reduce tensions and levels of violence (Day and Caus, 2019<sup>[43]</sup>; SIDA, 2020<sup>[44]</sup>). Such initiatives can allow groups to express grievances, address community fault-lines, reach mutual understandings, resolve escalating tensions before they lead to violence, compromise on shared roadmaps for peacebuilding and state building; and establish norms for protecting civilians and preserving human rights (Desai, 2020<sup>[45]</sup>).

Civilian peace missions such as UN Special Political Missions (SPMs) provide a platform for preventive diplomacy, supporting political dialogue, mediation, and reconciliation processes, as well as engaging in early warning, human rights monitoring and reporting and atrocity prevention. As highlighted in the New Agenda for Peace, such peace operations can play important roles in developing political strategies and solutions to address the structural drivers of conflict (UN, 2023, p. 13<sup>[8]</sup>). However, the effectiveness of peacebuilding, conflict-prevention and resolution activities depends on the extent to which they are attuned to the partner country's shifting political economy and security environment, including at a local level, and deployed in concert and with complementarity (Zürcher, 2022<sup>[22]</sup>).

## **Trends**

'Civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution' receives one of the largest shares of peace ODA across the 18 peace ODA purpose codes, but peace ODA itself is only a fraction of total ODA.<sup>12</sup> The data shows that both in volume and as a percentage of total ODA, investments in civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution increased up to 2018, after which there is some fluctuation in the funds allocated to the objective, with a dip in 2019 and 2020 (Figure 3.2). In 2021, official donors allocated a total of USD 2.7 billion to the objective, approximately half of which went towards fragile contexts (USD 1.3 billion). This volume amounts to 14% of total peace ODA, or 1.2% of total global ODA. That spending on this purpose code amounts to only 1.2% of total ODA indicates that the prevention agenda has not yet been integrated into development policies (OECD, 2022, p. 101<sup>[14]</sup>).

Germany, the EU, the United States and the United Kingdom have consistently remained the top four donors for civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution across the decade. In 2021, their cumulative contributions accounted for 67.8% of total spending for this peace category: Germany contributed 27%, the EU contributed 19.5%, the United States contributed 15% and the United Kingdom contributed 7%. Besides the EU, the UN Peacebuilding Fund and the World Bank (International Development Association) are the only multilateral actors within the top 10 contributing donors – accounting for 2.68% and 2.66% of global spending on this sector respectively.


Notably, half of DAC members spending on civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution allocated less than USD 6 million in 2021, and many of these allocations were less than 1 million in 2021. The small scale of such investments can limit the strategic impact and prevention effectiveness (Rotmann, Li and Stoffel, 2021, p. 30<sup>[46]</sup>). Some researchers estimate effective prevention expenditure as between USD 250-500 million per country per year, if it is well co-ordinated among donors and targeted towards the most serious risks (Mueller, 2017<sup>[34]</sup>).

The extent to which DAC members prioritise support to civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution within their own policies can be gauged by identifying the providers that allocate the largest portion of their own peace ODA to the objective. They include Germany, which allocated the highest portion of its peace ODA to civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution (24.9%), followed by Norway (23.6%), Finland (23.1%) and Denmark (22.7%).

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<sup>12</sup> Across the decade, civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution has consistently ranked within the top three peace ODA sectors receiving the highest share of global spending on peace.

**Figure 3.2. Official donors' contribution to civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution as a share of their total peace ODA (2012 - 2021)**



Source: Peace ODA is based on (OECD, 2022<sup>[19]</sup>), OECD Creditor Reporting System, <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=crs1>

### 3.3. Participation in international peacekeeping operations (purpose code 15230)

This purpose code covers both multi-lateral and bilateral ODA-eligible peacekeeping expenditures within a UN context. It includes the cost of a donor's bilateral participation in ODA-eligible activities (see examples below), net of any compensation received from the UN, when they are part of an international peace operation mandated or authorised by the UN through a Security Council resolution and conducted by international organisations. ODA-eligible activities in a peacekeeping context include: human rights and election monitoring; rehabilitation of basic national infrastructure; monitoring or retraining of civil administrators, penal/corrections personnel and police forces; security sector reform and other rule of law-related activities; training in customs and border control procedures; advice or training in fiscal or macroeconomic stabilisation policy; reintegration of demobilised soldiers; repatriation and demobilisation of armed factions, and disposal of their weapons; explosive mine removal and humanitarian-type activities. Tasks in relation to peace enforcement by military contingents are not ODA-eligible.

Direct contributions to the UN Department for Peace Operations (DPO) budget are excluded from bilateral ODA but they are reportable in part as multilateral ODA. An ODA coefficient of 15% is applied to members' assessed contributions to the UN peacekeeping budget, meaning that countries are allowed to report a share of their assessed financial contribution to the UN peacekeeping operations budget as multilateral ODA, irrespective of the activities conducted by the operations. Additionally, not all UN peacekeeping operations are ODA-eligible, nor is financing international engagement in post-conflict peacekeeping by non-UN international forces.

Source: OECD (2017<sup>[47]</sup>), Technical Review of the ODA Coefficient for UN Peacekeeping Operation, <https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/ODA-Coefficient-for-UN-Peacekeeping-Operations.pdf>; OECD (2021<sup>[48]</sup>), Converged Statistical Reporting Directives for the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) and the Annual DAC Questionnaire, [https://one.oecd.org/document/DCD/DAC/STAT\(2023\)9/ADD3/FINAL/en/pdf](https://one.oecd.org/document/DCD/DAC/STAT(2023)9/ADD3/FINAL/en/pdf).

### **What contribution to peace?**


UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) are an effective tool for helping to deliver the UN's *sustaining peace* agenda (UN, 2016<sup>[49]</sup>). The literature demonstrates that multilateral PKOs have a significantly positive and statistically significant effect on peace, including by enabling the cessation of fighting through facilitating negotiated settlements; reducing the intensity of violence in an ongoing conflict; limiting the contagion of conflict, and preventing conflict from erupting or recurring. For example, Lise Morjee Howard (2019, p. 47<sup>[50]</sup>) finds the presence of PKOs has positive effects on containing the spread of civil war, and Kyle Beardsley and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch (2015<sup>[51]</sup>) find that peacekeepers reduce the scope of violence by containing conflicts geographically. Moreover, Gates, Nygård and Trappeniers (2016<sup>[52]</sup>) find that the risk of conflict recurrence drops by up to 75% where UN peacekeepers are deployed, and Dominic Rohner and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya (2023<sup>[53]</sup>) find that UN peacekeeping can create favourable conditions for national reconciliation in post-conflict settings.

PKOs can provide the security necessary for providing the stability that allows political and societal peace processes to take place. Participation in these operations involves conducting key tasks that link together short-term security and long-term sustainable peace, including human rights monitoring, electoral assistance, security sector reform (SSR), and disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) programmes. For example, the aim of UN peacekeeping DDR programmes is to reduce the immediate threat to peace posed by groups of armed, uncontrolled, and unemployed ex-combatants, thus contributing to the creation of space needed for peace to consolidate at political and societal levels. Alongside stabilisation activities, PKOs can help create direct and indirect employment opportunities and create a stable enough environment for early development interventions, as well as creating the conditions for a better operational access for humanitarian action.

### **Trends**

Participation in international peacekeeping operations' receives one of the smaller shares of peace ODA within the 18 peace ODA categories. DAC members made up the bulk of global contributions in this area. In 2021, DAC member donors allocated USD 345 million to international peacekeeping, amounting to 2.3% of their total peace ODA or 0.2% of total ODA (Figure 3.3). For fragile contexts, DAC members allocated USD 135 million of ODA towards international peacekeeping, amounting to 2.5% of their total contribution to peace activities or 0.3% of total ODA in such contexts. The top DAC donors for peacekeeping operations have evolved and become more heavily concentrated over the past decade. In 2012, ODA for participation in peacekeeping operations was evenly dispersed across four donors: Switzerland, the Netherlands, Canada and Sweden— amounting to over half of such ODA. In 2021, two DAC donors account for almost two thirds of the ODA for peacekeeping: Germany (39.3%) and the EU (25.2%). The United Kingdom contributes 9.1%.

**Figure 3.3. DAC members' contribution to participation in international peacekeeping operations as a share of their total peace ODA (2012 - 2021)**



Source: Peace ODA is based on (OECD, 2022<sup>[19]</sup>), OECD Creditor Reporting System, <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=crs1>

### 3.4. Reintegration and small arms and light weapons control (purpose code 15240)

This purpose code covers the reintegration of demobilised military personnel into the economy, repatriation and demobilisation of armed factors, and disposal of their weapons. It also includes the conversion of production facilities from military to civilian outputs, and technical co-operation to control, prevent and/or reduce the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW). ODA-eligible activities under this purpose code are designed to support the development of relevant regulatory frameworks and institutional structures, SALW awareness campaigns, regional co-operation, and SALW collection and destruction programmes.

#### **What contribution to peace?**

Small arms and light weapons (SALWs) are a key tool for modern armed conflict – increasing both its frequency and intensity. The widespread availability and misuse of such weapons exacerbates and perpetuates ongoing conflicts by abetting and sustaining the armed violence of extremists, terrorists, and organised crime groups and by emboldening militants to pursue their objectives on the battlefield, rather than at the negotiating table (UN, 2019<sup>[54]</sup>). The increasing availability of SALW not only affects peace outcomes in fragile and post-conflict societies, but can also sustain a culture of interpersonal and gang-related violence in stable societies that are “at peace” (OECD, 2011<sup>[55]</sup>). As underlined in UN Security Council Resolution 2467, SALW have a disproportionate impact on violence perpetrated against women and girls and negative human rights, humanitarian, development and socio-economic consequences (UN, 2019<sup>[56]</sup>).

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development recognises these strong linkages between conventional arms control, security and economic development, with UN member states committed under SDG16 to ‘promote peaceful and inclusive societies’ by, among other things, significantly reducing illicit arms flows. Similarly, the UN Secretary General’s New Agenda for Peace recognises the key role played by SALW control in armed violence reduction, calling for whole-of-government approaches that integrate SALW control into development and violence reduction initiatives at the national and community levels, including in national prevention strategies (UN, 2023, p. 25<sup>[8]</sup>). Such activities are often embedded within conflict

prevention and peacebuilding agendas, namely disarmament demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR) programmes and the mandates of peacekeeping operations.

Equally, well-targeted support for reintegration of demobilised armed actors is key to ensure ex-combatants progress toward successful reinsertion in society. Effective re-integration can play a critical role in stabilising regions, curbing the illegal flow of SALW and/or achieving sustainable peace agreements with non-state armed groups. For example, supporting ex-combatants and their families with new forms of livelihood can play a critical role in preventing them from resorting to negative coping strategies to provide for themselves and their families (Tschunkert et al., 2023, p. 12<sup>[57]</sup>). As such, the effectiveness of their reintegration into civilian society requires economic sustainability and sustained support to reconciliation processes. Technical approaches integrating ex-combatants should constitute part of a broader local development programme that is also complemented with efforts to enhance political dialogue between divided groups.

### **Trends**

ODA for 'reintegration and SALW control' has fluctuated and overall decreased in volume over the decade. It also consistently receives one of the lowest shares of global peace ODA. In 2021, official donors allocated USD 80.7 million of ODA towards the objective of reintegration and SALW control. This volume amounts to 0.4% of total peace ODA, or 0.04% of total ODA (see Figure 3.4). Official donors spent the same share of peace ODA on reintegration and SALW control for fragile contexts, allocating USD 28.8 million to these contexts for this purpose.


Over the past decade, only a limited number of bilateral donors have allocated ODA to reintegration and SALW control. In 2012, the United States was the major donor for ODA to the sector, accounting for two thirds of global spending. In 2021, three donors now account for 77.6% of global spending on reintegration and SALW control: the United States (33.8%), Germany (23.9%) and the EU (20%). Over half of the contributing development co-operation providers allocated less than USD 1 million in funding,<sup>13</sup> and no DAC member allocated over 1% of their own total peace ODA portfolio to SALW control and reintegration.

Multilateral actors are key donors for reintegration and SALW control activities: in 2021, the EU contributed 20% of the total ODA for reintegration and SALW control, alongside the UN Peacebuilding Fund (8.9%) and the World Bank's International Development Association (IDA) (3.4%). It is possible that the contributions to SALW control activities are higher, however, since the CRS database does not capture donors' allocations to the core budgets of multilateral organisations such as United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) or the African Union (AU), which, as part of their wider mandates, implement or fund SALW control-related assistance.

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<sup>13</sup> In 2021, 15 of 23 official donors separately allocated less than USD 1 million to reintegration and SALW control for developing countries.

**Figure 3.4. Official donors' contribution to reintegration and SALW control as a share of their total peace ODA (2012 - 2021)**



Source: Peace ODA is based on (OECD, 2022<sup>[19]</sup>), OECD Creditor Reporting System, <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=crs1>

### 3.5. Removal of land mines and explosive remnants of war (purpose code 15250)

This purpose code covers any activity for civilian purposes that is related to land mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), and which have benefits to developing countries as their main objective. Activities that fit under the following broad activities are ODA-eligible: mine clearance and stockpile destruction; mine/ERW risk education and awareness raising; victim assistance; and research and development on demining and clearance. When these activities are undertaken in the context of an international peacekeeping operation, they are not covered by this purpose code.

#### ***What contribution to peace?***

Mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) action is closely associated with both sustainable peace, development, and humanitarian action. In conflict and post-conflict settings, mines and explosive remnants of war impede freedom of movement and limit livelihood capacity by preventing large portions of land from being developed and instilling fear and mistrust in populations. This, in turn, prevents sustainable economic and social recovery, and increases sources of community fragility. ODA for mine/ERW action serves to deliver immediate security benefits to civilians and a safer environment that is conducive to building local resilience and restoring livelihood capacities. Recent research finds that landmine removal had positive impacts on a range of outcomes, including increasing economic growth, citizen trust in government and productive land use (Patterson, 2023<sup>[58]</sup>). Moreover, mine action, including victim assistance, can promote positive peace through fostering equitable and peaceful societies, including through respect for human rights and international humanitarian law, the safe return of refugees and displaced population and the development of skills and attitudes to constructively manage conflict (Jung, 2017<sup>[59]</sup>). Finally, mine action can contribute effectively to other key programmes that support peace processes and which are commonly addressed in peace agreements, including disarmament demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR) (Maspoli, 2020<sup>[60]</sup>).


## Trends

ODA towards 'removal of landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) consistently receives one of the smallest shares of peace ODA amongst the 18 peace ODA sectors and an even smaller portion of total ODA. In 2021, official donors allocated USD 238 million of ODA towards the removal of landmines and ERW in fragile contexts. This volume amounts to 2.9% of total peace ODA or 0.2% of total ODA (see Figure 3.5). Moreover, according to the annual Landmine Monitor report for 2022, 2021 saw the lowest level of funding to the victim assistance area since 2016, despite growing needs and high casualty rates in recent years associated with increased conflict and contamination by improvised mines observed since 2015 (International Campaign to Ban Landmines, 2022<sup>[61]</sup>).<sup>14</sup>

In 2021, six official donors accounted for over two thirds of ODA for 'removal of landmines and ERW' in developing countries: the United States (24.5%), Germany (13.1%), the EU (10.3%), United Kingdom (9%), Saudi Arabia (7.9%) and Norway (7.5%). The data shows that multilateral actors are not prominent donors of ODA for the removal of landmines and ERW, excluding the EU.

The extent to which DAC members prioritise support to removal of landmines and ERW within their own policies can be gauged by identifying the providers that allocate the largest portion of their own peace ODA to the objective. They include Slovenia, which allocated the highest portion of its peace ODA to the sector (20.2%), followed by New Zealand (10.4%) Norway (6.8%) and Japan (6.5%).

**Figure 3.5. Official donors' contribution to removal of landmines and ERW as a share of their total peace ODA (2012 - 2021)**



Source: Peace ODA is based on (OECD, 2022<sup>[19]</sup>), OECD Creditor Reporting System, <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=crs1>

### 3.6. Child soldiers (prevention and demobilization) (purpose code 15261)

This purpose code covers technical co-operation with governments – and assistance to civil society organisations – to support and apply legislation for preventing child soldier recruitment, including activities aimed at improving educational or employment opportunities for children and building capacity

<sup>14</sup> According to the report, at least 5,544 people were injured or killed by mines and ERW in 2021. Civilians represented most of the victims recorded.

within civilian government and civil society to prevent children from becoming soldiers.<sup>15</sup> The purpose code also covers support for activities to demobilise, disarm, release, reintegrate, repatriate and resettle (DDRRR) child soldiers.

### ***What contribution to peace?***

Preventing child recruitment and demobilising those already associated with armed groups is vital to building safe and prosperous communities. If – at an age of heightened vulnerability – children are immersed in systems of violence and their values and identities are formulated under the guidance of armed groups, they can become vehicles of violence rather than citizens who can build stable peace and contribute effectively to national development (Haer and Böhmelt, 2015<sup>[62]</sup>; Blattman and Annan, 2010<sup>[63]</sup>; Wessells, 2009<sup>[64]</sup>). The risk of conflict recurrence increases with child soldiers recruited by rebel groups in an earlier dispute. Moreover, studies indicate that the strength of rebel organisations vis-à-vis the government may increase when child soldiers are recruited, fuelling further instability (Haer and Böhmelt, 2015<sup>[62]</sup>; Iman Seepersad, 2023<sup>[65]</sup>). Finally, the recruitment of child soldiers not only hinders positive peace but can also stunt human capital growth – thereby undermining a nation’s productivity and growth – because it often results in reduced schooling, skilled employment, and income, as well as high levels of psychological distress for those exposed to the most acute violence (Blattman and Annan, 2010<sup>[63]</sup>).<sup>16</sup>

As such, child soldier recruitment prevention and demobilization efforts that seek to empower children in conflict environments (including through prioritising education and employment opportunities) are important for increasing their sense of agency in society and counteracting causes of both voluntary and forced child recruitment. Effective demobilisation and reintegration interventions are also important for creating space to promote and consolidate peace at societal levels by allowing children to re-engage in positive social relations and productive civilian lives. Without this, they are more likely to be drawn into renewed violence.

### ***Trends***

‘Prevention and demobilisation of child soldiers’ has consistently received the smallest share of peace ODA amongst the 18 peace sectors. The volume of ODA from official donors towards child soldier prevention and demobilisation decreased from USD 20.6 million in 2012 to USD 10.2 million in 2021, now accounting for 0.05% of total peace ODA, or 0.0054% of total ODA (see Figure 3.6). In 2021, four official donors provided more than half of the ODA allocated towards prevention and demobilisation of child soldier recruitment: Sweden (20.6%), UNICEF (12.1%), Canada (9.9%) and Switzerland (9.2%). The data shows that multilateral actors – notably UNICEF – are prominent donors for preventing and demobilising child soldiers, together accounting for 27% of the total spending towards the objective in 2021.


In 2021, DAC countries allocated USD 3 million to support for child soldiers and demobilisation in East Africa – making it the primary recipient region for assistance in this peacebuilding activity. The bulk of this ODA was allocated to Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan. DAC members allocated no ODA towards the sector in Middle Eastern countries – besides Iraq which received less than USD 1 million – even though the Middle East ranks as the region with the highest number of children living in conflict zones at risk of recruitment and use. For example, children living in Afghanistan and Syria were reportedly at 95% risk or over of being recruited into armed forces or groups in 2020, yet no DAC providers allocated ODA for the

<sup>15</sup> Conversely, support to the armed forces themselves is not eligible, nor is assistance that contributes to the strengthening of the military or its fighting capacity.

<sup>16</sup> Child soldiering results in a dramatic decrease in lifetime earnings ability that comes from the lack of transferable skills gained from the experience and consequent deficiency in human capital.

prevention and demobilisation of child soldiers to these countries in 2020 nor 2021 (Save the Children, 2021, p. 13<sub>[66]</sub>).

**Figure 3.6. Official donors' contribution to child soldiers (prevention and demobilisation) as a share of their total peace ODA (2012 - 2021)**



Source: Peace ODA is based on (OECD, 2022<sub>[19]</sub>), OECD Creditor Reporting System, <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=crs1>

### 3.7. Public sector policy and administrative management (purpose code 15110)

This purpose code covers institution-building assistance to strengthen core public sector management systems and capacities. Included within this category is support to general public policy management, co-ordination, planning and reform; human resource management; organisational development; civil service reform; e-government; development planning, monitoring and evaluation; and support to ministries involved in aid co-ordination.

#### ***What contribution to peace?***

Core public administrative functions are important mechanisms through which countries can own the broader process of peace and state building, in particular the political process of raising revenue, setting development outcomes, planning and executing budgets and deepening the political settlement (UNDP, 2014<sub>[67]</sub>). Moreover, strong public policy management is important for enabling more effective public service delivery and governance of state administrative and social services, which in turn, may support stabilisation and peace outcomes (Blum and Rogger, 2021<sub>[68]</sub>). For example, when the public workforce is under-resourced and under-paid, the quality of social service provision is weaker as are the institutional protections against rent-seeking and corruption (Hasnain, Baig and Mukhtarova, 2022<sub>[69]</sub>). Uneven access to public services can fuel resentment based on feelings of injustice and exclusion, which can in turn undermine the social contract. Conversely, public service delivery that is responsive and equitable is likely to support the development of a healthy state-society compact by helping to build and sustain citizen trust in government as well as state legitimacy and accountability to society (OECD, 2011, p. 37<sub>[70]</sub>; McCandless, 2012, p. 17<sub>[71]</sub>)

The establishment of appropriate governance is strongly linked to progress in promoting peace, development and protection of human rights. The World Bank conducted an evaluation in 2016 that emphasised the importance of strengthening legitimate institutions and governance to provide citizen

security, justice and jobs for breaking cycles of violence and helping restore stable development paths in fragile contexts (World Bank, 2016<sup>[72]</sup>). Finally, sound administrative management in areas such as aid coordination can be a major contributor to peace objectives by enhancing the state's capacity to absorb and effectively administer development finance in support of stability and peacebuilding outcomes.


However, internal armed conflicts are commonly fought over the government, governance, or territory of a state. When the government or governance of the state is contested and the government is one of the parties in an armed conflict, strengthening government functions of that state can be seen as partisan and can fuel tensions and violence. Additionally, public sector labour disputes between the government and state employees can occur in countries emerging from conflict, which, if overlooked, can result in violent conflict (UNDP, 2014, p. 42<sup>[67]</sup>). Whether support to public sector policy and administrative management de facto contributes to sustaining peace therefore depends on whether it has been intentionally and effectively designed based on sound conflict analysis, to address drivers of conflict and enhance sources of resilience. Moreover, evidence shows that, in post-conflict countries – where there is often low capacity and trust in government – support for systemic reforms to public administration is not always successful (UNDP, 2014<sup>[67]</sup>), highlighting the importance of appropriately tailoring investments in public sector policy and administrative management to the specific context.

### Trends

Since 2012, public sector policy and administrative management has consistently ranked within the top 3 priority areas to which DAC members have allocated the highest share of their peace ODA. Official donors allocated USD 3.7 billion to public sector policy and administrative management in 2021. This volume amounts to 19.3% of total peace ODA or 1.7% of total ODA (see Figure 3.7). Official donors allocated a slightly higher portion of total peace ODA to public sector policy and administrative management for fragile contexts (22.4%).

Multilateral actors play a catalytic role as donors for public sector policy and administrative management, notably the World Bank (IDA), the EU and the African Development Fund. In 2021, 21 multilateral agencies accounted for over half of the total amount of global ODA allocated towards public sector policy and administrative management for developing contexts. The main bilateral providers to public sector policy and administrative management are the United States, which contributed 10.8% of total ODA to the sector, followed by France (9%) and Germany (5.5%). The extent to which DAC members prioritise public sector policy and administrative management within their own policies can be gauged by identifying the providers that allocate the largest portion of their own peace ODA to the objective. Korea allocates the highest portion of its peace ODA to the sector (57.9%), followed by France (42.3%), Australia (31.5%) and Hungary (24%).

**Figure 3.7. Official donors' ODA to public sector policy and administrative management as a share of their total peace ODA (2012 - 2021)**



Source: Peace ODA is based on (OECD, 2022<sup>[19]</sup>), OECD Creditor Reporting System, <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=crs1>

### 3.8. Public finance management (PFM) (purpose code 15111)

This purpose code covers support to fiscal policy and planning, and ministries of finance. It includes activities that seek to strengthen financial and managerial accountability, public expenditure management, improve financial management systems, budget drafting, inter-governmental fiscal relations, public audit, and public debt.

#### ***What contribution to peace?***

Public finance management (PFM) has important development benefits. (Thompson, 2020, p. 27<sup>[73]</sup>) There is evidence of links between economic, fiscal and conflict risks more broadly, such that having the fiscal space to respond to economic shocks can lower the risk of armed conflict. Terms of trade shocks lead to more violence in countries with higher inequality and lower fiscal space, especially due to external debt (Leepipatpiboon, Castrovillari and Mineyama, 2023, p. 5<sup>[74]</sup>). Moreover, developing fiscal institutions is significantly associated with building resilience (Deléchat et al., 2018<sup>[75]</sup>). Economic resilience – including through efforts to preserve economic stability and the functionality of macroeconomic policy institutions – is particularly key for conflict-affected states given the volatility of development aid and the overreliance on humanitarian systems to assist vulnerable populations (IMF, 2023, p. 41<sup>[76]</sup>).

Sound public finance policies and planning can also contribute significantly to peace outcomes. In conflict and post-conflict settings, effective, fit-for-purpose and transparent public financial management, expenditure management and governance are critical to enabling the state to efficiently manage its resources. This is a crucial element in building trust and credibility with the population as well as with external financing partners. The ability to raise and spend revenues, if well-managed, can help address the structural causes of war, assist with economic stabilization, restore state legitimacy, and repair fragile social contracts, serving as a bedrock for sustainable peace.<sup>17</sup> The effectiveness of other peacebuilding activities is often highly intertwined with PFM, including security sector reform, demobilisation, reintegration and implementation of peace agreements.

However, in conflict settings and/or politically constrained contexts where state legitimacy is weak and/or the government is a party in an internal armed conflict, PFM alone is unlikely to restore state legitimacy. It is important to integrate conflict sensitivity in PFM programming in conflict settings in order to avoid doing harm. When PFM is supported with the expectation that it should contribute to peace objectives, a targeted and intentional approach is crucial.

#### ***Trends***

ODA for PFM has fluctuated both in total volume and as a share of total peace ODA over the past decade, and particularly since 2019. Spending on PFM surged in 2020, reaching a ten-year record high – possibly due to increased emphasis on fiscal support in response to the Covid-19 pandemic. The total expenditure on PFM by the World Bank (IDA) more than doubled in volume between 2019 and 2020.<sup>18</sup> The drop in global spending towards the PFM objective in 2021 reflected a decrease in the level of such expenditure

<sup>17</sup> Revenue policy and administration is covered under purpose code 15114, which is not at this point included in the definition of peace ODA.


<sup>18</sup> For example, the World Bank (IDA) allocated USD 1.3 billion in 2020 for PFM in developing countries – up from USD 597 million in 2019.

by both the World Bank (IDA) and Germany.<sup>19</sup> In 2021, official donors allocated USD 1.8 billion towards PFM, amounting to 9.2% of total peace ODA and 0.8% of their total ODA (see Figure 3.8). Official donors allocated a higher share of their peace ODA in the 60 fragile contexts towards PFM (12%, or 1.1% of total ODA in such contexts).

Official donors spent USD 976 million on PFM in fragile contexts in 2021, with multilateral actors making up the lion's share of this spending. Unsurprisingly, international financial institutions, notably the World Bank (IDA), are a major donor for PFM. For example, the World Bank (IDA), the Asian Development Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank together accounted for over half of all spending on PFM for developing countries in 2021.

The extent to which DAC members prioritise PFM within their own policies can be gauged by identifying the providers that allocate the largest portion of their own peace ODA to the area. Those that prioritise it differ from those that provide the largest contributions: the Slovak Republic allocates the highest portion of its peace ODA to the sector (32.3%), followed by Luxembourg (17.4%), Germany (13.8%) and Switzerland (8.1%).

**Figure 3.8. Official donors' ODA to public financial management as a share of their total peace ODA (2012 - 2021)**



Source: Peace ODA is based on (OECD, 2022<sup>[19]</sup>), OECD Creditor Reporting System, <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=crs1>

### 3.9. Decentralisation and support to subnational government (purpose code 15112)

This purpose code covers activities that support the political, administrative, and fiscal dimensions of the decentralisation process – that is, the transfer of powers and responsibilities from the central government level to elected authorities at the subnational level. It includes activities that assist

<sup>19</sup> The World Bank's International Development Association decreased its spending on PFM in 2021: it allocated USD 813 million in 2021 for PFM in developing countries, down from USD 1.3 billion in 2020. Germany also decreased its spending on PFM in 2021: it allocated USD 401 million in 2021 for PFM in developing countries, down from USD 868 million.

intergovernmental relations and federalism, and that strengthen departments and authorities of regional and local government (including their national associations).

Source: OECD (2019<sup>[77]</sup>). Making Decentralisation Work: A Handbook for Policy-Makers, [http://www.oecd.org/cfe/Policy%20highlights\\_decentralisation-Final.pdf](http://www.oecd.org/cfe/Policy%20highlights_decentralisation-Final.pdf).

### **What contribution to peace?**

Decentralisation processes can contribute to conflict prevention, stabilisation and peacebuilding by reducing regional inequities and strengthening local perceptions of self-determination (Edwards and Yilmaz, 2016, p. 356<sup>[78]</sup>). Transferring power to the sub-national level can have a stabilising impact by expanding citizen participation and voice in the political process and making government more easily accessible (Sambanis and Milanovic, 2014<sup>[79]</sup>). A more equitable political representation can avoid centre-periphery dynamics and reduce incentives to support violence to settle political disputes. Moreover, fiscal decentralisation can result in enhanced allocative efficiency and accountability, with associated improvements in the provision of public services and state legitimacy (OECD, 2019, p. 9<sup>[77]</sup>).

However, while support to decentralisation processes can be a useful tool for defusing tensions, building state capacity, establishing the legitimacy of institutions and improving public sector efficiency, its effectiveness in fragile contexts hinges on multiple conditions – not least political will of the central government and capacity of local government (Zürcher, 2020, p. 22<sup>[80]</sup>). It is also recognised that decentralisation processes (or lack thereof) can be used as a tool for patronage that can, counterintuitively, entrench centralised power and exacerbate conflict – depending on the country context and, especially, on the nature of the conflict itself (De Alwis, 2019<sup>[81]</sup>). The peace-positive impact of investments in the transfer of power from central to local or regional governments therefore depends on whether they have been intentionally and effectively designed based on conflict sensitivity and sound political economy analysis, with deliberate attention to addressing drivers of conflict and enhancing drivers of peace, in context.


### **Trends**

'Decentralisation and subnational government' consistently ranks within the top three peace sectors in terms of the share of peace ODA allocated towards it. However, ODA towards this objective has steadily decreased in the last five years. In 2021, official donors allocated USD 1.3 billion towards decentralisation and subnational government, which amounts to 6.6% of total peace ODA and 0.6% of their total ODA (see Figure 3.9). Official donors allocated 8% of their peace ODA in the 60 fragile contexts towards the objective of decentralisation.

The World Bank (IDA) is a prominent donor for decentralisation and support for subnational government, accounting for 33.4% of the total global spending in this area in developing countries in 2021. Nevertheless, it has decreased the volume and share of total ODA it allocates towards decentralisation and support to subnational government each year since 2019.

In 2021, the largest DAC member providers for decentralisation and support for subnational government were the EU (16.5%), Germany (15.4%), France (9.1%) and the United States (8.3%). The extent to which DAC members prioritise decentralisation and support for subnational government within their own policies can be gauged by identifying the providers that allocate the largest portion of their own peace ODA to the sector. Those that prioritise it include Switzerland, which allocates the highest portion of its peace ODA to the sector (16.3%), followed by France (14.6%), Belgium (10.3%) and the EU (7.3%).

**Figure 3.9. Official donors' ODA to decentralisation and support for subnational government as a share of their total peace ODA (2012 - 2021)**



Source: Peace ODA is based on (OECD, 2022<sup>[19]</sup>), OECD Creditor Reporting System, <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=crs1>

### 3.10. Anti-corruption organizations and institutions (purpose code 15113)

This purpose code covers support for specialised organisations, institutions and frameworks that seek to prevent and combat corruption, bribery, money-laundering and other aspects of organised crime. This includes anti-corruption commissions and monitoring bodies, special investigation services, institutions and initiatives of integrity and ethics oversight, specialised NGOs, and other anti-corruption civil society organisations.

#### ***What contribution to peace?***

The links between corruption, fragility and conflict are well-established (OECD, 2009<sup>[82]</sup>). Weak institutions and conflict fuel corruption, while corruption feeds conflict and instability (Stiftung, 2014<sup>[83]</sup>). Firstly, corruption can lead to the diversion of state resources, including funding for essential services, which creates inequality, undermines state legitimacy and sparks social and economic grievances within society. Corruption can increase dissatisfaction and demands for political change that may, in turn, trigger social unrest and political violence. Corruption can also fuel greed, providing motivations for opposition groups to try and capture the state through violent means, and for the state to use violent means to repress opposition (Le Billon, 2003<sup>[84]</sup>).

Support for entities that seek to reduce corruption, dismantle conflict economies and promote good governance can therefore help combat these sources of grievance and potential violence. In post-disaster and post-conflict situations, reducing corruption risks can help consolidate state legitimacy and safeguard reconstruction efforts (IMF, 2023, p. 38<sup>[76]</sup>). Moreover, in fragile or conflict-affected contexts, support to strengthen accountability mechanisms is particularly important as national budgets and aid programmes may be subverted by elite patronage networks, who benefit from and become the gatekeepers to aid and services (Jackson, 2005<sup>[85]</sup>).

Yet, a lack of political will on the part of the governing elites to embrace reforms that could endanger their mode of governance has been shown to limit the effectiveness of anti-corruption aid programmes and other interventions to facilitate greater accountability and more robust formal institutions (Zürcher, 2022<sup>[22]</sup>).


Moreover, there are potential dangers to strengthening anti-corruption bodies in repressive political settings, including that such bodies can be used by the regime to neutralise political opponents, generate further violence and impede peace (Wathne, 2021<sup>[86]</sup>). Political or religious entities fighting corruption may also convey values that are at odds with those supported by the DAC. Special care should therefore be taken when selecting partners and entities at country level to ‘do no harm.’

### Trends

‘Anti-corruption organisations and institutions’ has consistently received one of the smallest shares of DAC members’ total peace ODA since 2012. In 2021, only 1% of DAC members’ peace ODA in fragile contexts was allocated towards anti-corruption organisations and institutions, which amounts to 0.1% of their total ODA. There is a marginal difference between the expenditure on this category as a portion of peace ODA for all developing countries and fragile contexts, though it is even smaller in fragile contexts (see Figure 3.10).

The United Kingdom, the EU and the United States are the top DAC members funding anti-corruption organisations and institutions, together accounting for over half (57%) of total DAC members spending on this sector. The data shows that multilateral actors are not a prominent donor for anti-corruption organisations and institutions, excluding the EU. The extent to which DAC members prioritise support for anti-corruption organizations and institutions within their own policies can be gauged by identifying the providers that allocate the largest portion of their own peace ODA to the sector. Those that prioritise it include Luxembourg (4.2%), the United Kingdom (4.2%), Slovenia (4%), followed by Korea (3.4%).

**Figure 3.10. DAC members’ contribution to anti-corruption organisations and institutions as a share of their total peace ODA (2012 - 2021)**



Source: Peace ODA is based on (OECD, 2022<sup>[19]</sup>), OECD Creditor Reporting System, <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=crs1>

### 3.11. Legal and judicial development (purpose code 15130)

This purpose code covers support to formal institutions, systems and procedures of the justice sector, as well as to traditional, indigenous and paralegal practices that fall outside the formal legal system. It includes activities that support the improvement of legal frameworks, constitutions, laws and regulations; legislative and constitutional drafting and review; legal reform; and the integration of formal and informal systems of law. Finally, it includes public legal education, as well as awareness campaigns

and activities that support the dissemination of information on entitlements and remedies for injustice. Funding for legal and judicial development activities is distinct from those primarily undertaken in connection with post-conflict activities or which are primarily aimed at supporting security sector reform activities.

### ***What contribution to peace?***

Negative experiences of justice are a well-understood cause for grievance, instability and the mobilisation of political violence and conflict. Weak or biased judicial systems, particularly as it relates to populations' access to justice, can create perceptions of exclusion from the social contract (UN/World Bank, 2017<sup>[87]</sup>), fuelling resentment that undermines social cohesion and sparks or further exacerbates conflict and fragility. Judicial and legal development that enhances citizens' equal access to justice is therefore a central component of the peacebuilding process. Similarly, inclusive transitional justice processes – when context-specific, nationally-owned, and focused on the needs of victims – are critical for consolidating peace and stability. They can help address societal grievances and divisions through reform paths that render justice for past violations and pursue reparations and guarantees of non-recurrence. (OCHA, 2020<sup>[88]</sup>)

Strengthening the rule of law has been associated with better enforcement of civil codes and laws, increased citizen protection and enduring peace, particularly in ethnically heterogeneous societies (Easterly, 2001, pp. 687-706<sup>[89]</sup>). Mechanisms to resolve disputes in a peaceful, equitable and inclusive manner using the legal system can minimise grievances and disincentivize violence. Access to, and understanding of, remedies for injustice can also mitigate gender-based and economic inequalities, by combating impunity for sexual and gender-based violence and providing fair and peaceful mechanisms for land tenure and property rights dispute resolution (OECD / Open Society Foundations, 2016<sup>[90]</sup>). Finally, support to the development of customary justice systems, in addition to national justice systems, can represent a key source of community resilience in fragile contexts given they often provide functional dispute resolution mechanisms (Bennet et al., 2022<sup>[40]</sup>).

However, given that the contribution to peace in this type of work has so much to do with perceived justice and fairness, it is important to consider context-specific understandings of authority and legitimacy, and how those understandings relate to conflict. When legal and judicial development is supported with the expectation that it should contribute to peace, a targeted and intentional approach is required, including through actively applying conflict sensitivity.

### ***Trends***


DAC members' ODA for legal and judicial development in fragile contexts and developing countries is decreasing, but it nevertheless consistently ranks within the top four sectors receiving the highest share of DAC members' peace ODA since 2012. In 2021, DAC members spent USD 7.6% of their total peace ODA on legal and judicial development for developing countries, amounting to USD 1.2 billion. They allocated USD 456 million to legal and judicial development for the 60 fragile contexts, amounting to 8.6% of their total peace ODA and less than 1% of their total ODA for fragile contexts (see Figure 3.11). These are the lowest volumes and percentages of total peace ODA allocated by DAC members to this objective since 2006 for both developing countries and fragile contexts. Such financing trends are concerning given that in 2019, one and a half billion people had unmet civil and administrative justice needs and 253 million people lived in extreme conditions of injustice (Long, Ponce and Andersen, 2019<sup>[91]</sup>).

In 2021, the United States (40.2%) and the EU (16.6%) together accounted for more than half of DAC members' total spending on this sector. Four other DAC countries contributed between 5% and 6%

respectively: Australia, Germany, France and the Netherlands.<sup>20</sup> The data shows that, besides the EU, multilateral actors are not prominent donors for legal and judicial development.

The extent to which DAC members prioritise legal and judicial development within their own policies can be gauged by identifying the providers that allocate the largest portion of their own peace ODA to the sector. These include New Zealand, which allocates the highest portion of its peace ODA to the sector (26%), the Czech Republic (21.6%), Japan (21.2%) and Australia (20.9%).

**Figure 3.11. DAC members' contribution to legal and judicial development as a share of their total peace ODA (2012 - 2021)**



Source: Peace ODA is based on (OECD, 2022<sup>[19]</sup>), OECD Creditor Reporting System, <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=crs1>

### 3.12. Democratic participation and civil society (purpose code 15150)

This purpose code comprises activities aimed at strengthening civil-society governance and the exercise of democracy, including through support to democratic processes and diverse forms of participation of citizens beyond elections. It includes support for direct democracy instruments such as referenda and citizens' initiatives; assistance for civic education; and support to organisations to represent and advocate for their members to monitor, engage and hold governments to account. The purpose code is restricted to activities targeting governance issues.

#### **What contribution to peace?**

Active and meaningful citizen engagement is important for ensuring a government is accountable and serves the public good, which, in turn, can strengthen the social contract and help build a state's legitimacy. By facilitating inclusive participation and the pursuit of government accountability, a robust civil society therefore helps to promote just, peaceful, and inclusive societies (SDG16) (OECD, 2020<sup>[92]</sup>). Specifically, civil society organisations have been proven to provide important structures for bottom-up social or political engagement and in bridging local and national conflict prevention initiatives (Giessman, Galvanek and

<sup>20</sup> The US allocated USD 465.315 (40% the DAC members' total ODA for this purpose code), EU allocated USD 191.579 (16.55% the DAC members' total ODA for this purpose code), Australia allocated USD 72.385 (6% the DAC members' total ODA for this purpose code) and Germany allocated USD 66.105 (5% of the DAC members' total ODA for this purpose code).

Seifert, 2017, p. 45<sup>[93]</sup>). Proportional representation also correlates with a lower likelihood of conflict (Reynal-Querol, 2002<sup>[94]</sup>). Strengthening the governance capacities of civil society can enable preconditions for positive peace, including in the areas of monitoring and protection, public and non-public advocacy, social cohesion between adversarial groups and mediation.

However, donor support for democratic participation and civil society is likely to be less effective in crisis contexts if it does not resonate with local priorities, and if it is not undertaken as part of a broader political strategy, combined with a suite of other peacebuilding tools to address political elites (Hensing et al., 2023, p. 104<sup>[95]</sup>). Moreover, the peace and conflict prevention contribution of civil society actors may be negligible or even counter-productive if they represent narrow interests or show insensitivity to opposing interests, reinforce patronage networks or entrench exclusionary institutions (or are perceived to do so) (Grandvionnet and Chasara, 2019, p. 14<sup>[96]</sup>).

### **Trends**


'Democratic participation and civil society' consistently ranks within the top four sectors receiving the highest share of DAC members' total peace ODA since 2012. This likely reflects the strong priority that DAC members afford to inclusive political processes as an element of inclusive development and to poverty reduction. DAC members also recognise that civil society actors, in their diversity, are critical contributors to peacebuilding, as highlighted in the 2021 DAC Recommendation on enabling civil society (OECD/LEGAL/5021, n.d., p. 3<sup>[97]</sup>). Similarly, the G7 – made up of some of the leading peace donors – reaffirmed at the 2023 G7 Summit their shared belief that democracy is “the most enduring means to advance peace, prosperity, equality and sustainable development.” (G7 Leaders Summit, 2023<sup>[98]</sup>)

Since 2015, DAC members have steadily increased the share of their peace ODA allocated towards democratic participation and civil society in developing countries, allocating USD 2.3 billion towards the objective in 2021. This volume amounts to 14.9% of their total peace ODA and 1.4% of their total ODA (see Figure 3.12). Members allocated the same share of their total ODA towards the objective in the 60 fragile contexts, contributing USD 684 million.

In 2021, four DAC members together accounted for 71% of DAC members' ODA on democratic participation and civil society in developing countries: the United States (27.6%), Germany (20.4%), the EU (12.9%) and Sweden (10.1%). The data shows that, besides the EU, multilateral actors are not prominent donors for democratic participation and civil society, nor are non-DAC providers.

The extent to which DAC members prioritise support to democratic participation and civil society within their own policies can be gauged by identifying the providers that allocate the largest portion of their own peace ODA to the sector. These include Sweden, which allocates the highest portion of its peace ODA to the sector (25%), followed by Belgium (24.6%) and the Netherlands (24.5%).

**Figure 3.12. DAC members' contribution to democratic participation and civil society as a share of their total peace ODA (2012 - 2021)**



Source: Peace ODA is based on (OECD, 2022<sup>[19]</sup>), OECD Creditor Reporting System, <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=crs1>

### 3.13. Legislatures and political parties (purpose code 15152)

This purpose code captures support for strengthening key functions and capacity of legislative bodies and parliaments, as well as assistance to political parties and their party systems. Activities within this sector include training programmes for legislators and support personnel; support for representation, oversight and legislation of subnational assemblies and councils; and support for administrative procedures, research, and information management systems.

#### ***What contribution to peace?***

The existence of a strong legislature has been shown in quantitative studies to be highly correlated with a strong democracy and an open society (Fish, 2006<sup>[99]</sup>), further reinforcing political resilience. Legislatures have a critical role to play in managing conflict as guarantors of pluralism and minority interests (Dutta et al., 2007<sup>[100]</sup>; Taylor, 2005<sup>[101]</sup>) and in providing power-sharing mechanisms that are politically inclusive and have oversight. Parliamentary dialogue and co-operation in committee work on both conflict and non-conflict issues can foster trust and personal connection between otherwise opposing party groups – essential to effective governance and offering an alternative to political violence (Caspersen and Sindre, 2020<sup>[102]</sup>).

Additionally, strong parliaments can ensure that key aspects of peace agreements are translated into legislation and effectively implemented. Therefore, capacity training that emphasises conflict context and the specific actors involved is important for long-term peacebuilding, particularly in post-conflict contexts where the peace settlement has led to the establishment of interim arrangements and where either parliament or the parties lack training in the formal workings of the institution (Caspersen and Sindre, 2020<sup>[102]</sup>). An effective legislature can exercise oversight and accountability over the executive and serve as a check on its control, without which the executive could abuse minority interests or take actions that allow conflict to erupt (Grant and Keohane, 2005<sup>[103]</sup>).

However, a parliament must have the political will to respond to the citizens it represents if it is to effectively exercise this accountability role. In fragile contexts, there is often a lack of trust and weak relation between

legislators and citizens (OECD, 2009<sup>[104]</sup>). As such, if support to legislatures and political parties is not well-attuned to local power dynamics in relation to context-specific drivers of conflict, it may have limited impact or can even risk doing harm by inadvertently exacerbating conflict divisions and tensions. A targeted and intentional approach is of utmost importance when ODA is used to support legislatures and political parties with the expectation that it should contribute to peace.


### Trends

ODA towards 'legislatures and political parties' is one of the peace categories receiving least attention from DAC members, ranking consistently within the bottom four areas over the past decade. DAC members have also consistently decreased the volume and share of total peace ODA they allocate towards legislatures and political parties. In 2021, DAC members spent USD 59.7 million on ODA towards 'legislatures and political parties' in developing countries – the lowest volume allocated in over a decade. This volume amounts to 0.4% of their total peace ODA and 0.04% of their total ODA (see Figure 3.13). Members allocated the same share of their total peace ODA and total ODA in the 60 fragile contexts.

Four donors together account for almost 75% of DAC members' spending on legislatures and political parties in developing countries: the United States (25.2%), Sweden (19.7%), the EU (17.6%) and Norway (12.2%). The data shows that, besides the EU, multilateral actors are not prominent donors for legislatures and political parties.

The extent to which DAC members prioritise support to legislatures and political parties within their own policies can be gauged by identifying the providers that allocate the largest portion of their own peace ODA to the sector. These include New Zealand, which allocates the highest portion of its peace ODA to the sector (3.7%), followed by Norway (1.7%) and Finland (1.4%).

**Figure 3.13. DAC members' contribution to legislatures and political parties as a share of their total peace ODA (2012 - 2021)**



Source: Peace ODA is based on (OECD, 2022<sup>[19]</sup>), OECD Creditor Reporting System, <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=crs1>

### 3.14. Media and free flow of information (purpose code 15153)

This purpose code captures activities that support the free and uncensored flow of information on public issues; and activities that increase both the editorial and technical skills and the integrity of the print and broadcast media (such as training journalists).

#### ***What contribution to peace?***

Media freedom and the uncensored flow of information on matters of public interest constitutes an essential foundation of democracy and an important factor underpinning societal resilience. A free press enables informed democratic discourse, allowing citizens to communicate their needs and desires to government and exchange information and ideas. There are numerous contributions that free and strong media institutions can make to conflict prevention and peacebuilding. These include, as Betz and Williams (2017<sup>[105]</sup>) elaborate: 1) strengthened societal cohesion by enabling bridges to be built between different communities and giving voices to the more marginalised groups; 2) improved governance by holding elites accountable and helping citizens become active stakeholders in society; 3) enhanced knowledge and critical thinking on complex issues; 4) support to conflict early warning and increased pressure to address it; 5) provision of emotional outlets to share societal grievances and defuse mistrust; and 6) increased participation in peacebuilding by motivating action within society (Betz and Williams, 2017<sup>[105]</sup>).

Conversely, biased media can amplify societal divides, sow distrust, foment unrest and incite conflict, including through hate speech or ethnic, religious or nationalist myth-mongering. Misinformation, disinformation and hate speech – which are rampant on social media platforms – are destabilising and can be deadly in volatile societal and political contexts, making access to reliable information critical (UN, 2023, p. 6<sup>[8]</sup>). Activities that increase the technical competency of journalists – including through teaching impartiality, conflict-sensitive journalism and training on how to counter hate media when it arises in community outlets – are therefore essential to ensuring media is harnessed as a tool for peace (Himelfarb and Chabalowski, 2008<sup>[106]</sup>).


#### ***Trends***

DAC members' ODA for media and free flow of information is increasing but remains low, especially when compared to other peace ODA sectors. In 2021, DAC members allocated USD 681 million towards media and free flow of information in developing countries. This volume amounts to 4.5% of total peace ODA or 0.4% of total ODA (see Figure 3.14). DAC members allocated a smaller share of their peace ODA towards media and free flow of information in the 60 fragile contexts (USD 96 million), amounting to 1.8% of peace ODA and 0.2% of their total ODA for such contexts.

In 2021, Germany and the United Kingdom together contributed almost two thirds of DAC members' total ODA for this sector in developing countries (42.5% and 21.5% respectively). Sweden and the United States are also top donors, contributing 9% and 8.9% respectively. The data shows that multilateral actors, excluding the EU, are not prominent donors for media and free flow of information.

The extent to which DAC members prioritise support to this objective within their own policies can be gauged by identifying the providers that allocate the largest portion of their own peace ODA to the sector. Those that appear to prioritise it include Poland, which allocates the highest portion of its peace ODA to the sector (38.4%), followed by the United Kingdom (15.1%), the Czech Republic (10.7%) and Germany (10%).

**Figure 3.14. DAC members' contribution to media and free flow of information as a share of their total peace ODA (2012 - 2021)**



Source: Peace ODA is based on (OECD, 2022<sup>[19]</sup>), OECD Creditor Reporting System, <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=crs1>

### 3.15. Human Rights (purpose code 15160)

This purpose code captures measures to support specialised official human rights institutions and mechanisms at universal, regional, national, and local levels in their statutory roles to promote and protect civil and political, economic, social and cultural rights as defined in international conventions and covenants. It also includes efforts to translate international human rights commitments into national legislation. Moreover, it includes support for human rights defenders, NGOs, dialogues, advocacy, activism, mobilisation, awareness raising and public education, as well as human rights programming targeting specific minority or vulnerable groups.

#### ***What contribution to peace?***

Many goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development are anchored in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,<sup>21</sup> and as outlined by a UN Secretary General report in 2018, “Member States’ obligations under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights [and the human rights treaties] provide a critical foundation for sustaining peace” (Guterres, 2018<sup>[107]</sup>). Countries where governments violate human rights – especially the right to physical integrity – are at a higher risk of violent conflict (Cingranelli et al., 2019<sup>[108]</sup>). For example, state-based human rights violations can compromise the public perceptions of legitimacy towards their government, leading to anti-state grievances – particularly among those who are marginalised – which, in turn, can fuel support for and recruitment by extremist movements (Walsh and Piazza, 2010<sup>[109]</sup>).

Given the role of human rights abuses as a root cause of grievances and potential violent conflict, efforts to strengthen human rights and protect against discrimination have an important role to play in conflict prevention (UN, 2023<sup>[8]</sup>). ODA for the promotion and protection of human rights can facilitate important solutions for addressing grievances peacefully and effectively, including before they materialise (OCHA,

<sup>21</sup> For example, the UN Declaration of Human Rights outlines a “common standard of achievement” for all peoples and nations in order to lessen the risk of violent conflict and avoid “recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression.”

2020<sup>[88]</sup>). A human rights-based approach emphasizes inclusive and meaningful participation, including in negotiation and consultation processes or the setting-up of mechanisms relating to peace at the national and sub-national levels. This can help to build confidence in institutions and bridge social divides through the emphasis on strengthening common values and a sense of shared humanity, which helps to address hostility and mistrust among groups and between the state and individuals or groups.

There is also a strong ‘business case’ for human-rights-integrated prevention strategies. Estimates from the Universal Rights Group, building on the modelling in *Pathways for Peace* (UN/World Bank, 2017<sup>[87]</sup>), find that human rights-integrated prevention strategies have the potential to save USD 4 billion in averted costs of conflict annually, contributing to a rate-of-return of 5 – 1 (USD 5 for every USD 1 invested) (Limon and Montoya, 2020, p. 50<sup>[110]</sup>), on top of the 16 – 1 rate-of-return to investments in conflict prevention.


However, when groups argue for their rights at the expense of the rights of others, this may feed tensions and conflict, reinforcing the zero-sum logic that often prevails in conflict (SIDA, 2022<sup>[111]</sup>). Mitigating against the possible unintended negative effects of support for activities within this field therefore requires applying conflict sensitivity and emphasising the universality of human rights. Whether investments in human rights institutions and mechanisms de facto supports peace or not depends on whether it has been intentionally and effectively designed based on sound conflict analysis, in order to address drivers of conflict and enhance drivers of peace, in context.

### **Trends**

DAC members’ ODA for human rights in developing countries gradually increased over the decade in volume and as a percentage of total peace ODA. While the percentage of peace ODA allocated by DAC members to the human rights objective stagnated between 2017 – 2020, a record high contribution of 7.1% of their total peace ODA was allocated to human rights in developing countries in 2021, with DAC members spending USD 1.08 billion (see Figure 3.15). This volume amounts to 0.7% of their total ODA. Members allocated the same share of their total ODA in the 60 fragile contexts (0.7%, amounting to USD 364 million). Historically, ODA to human rights as a share of total ODA has remained constant at 0.7-0.8% of the total, except in 2016 where it was slightly lower. It is important to note that DAC members’ ODA towards human rights activities is likely higher if considering a more expansive perspective on human rights, which includes programmes to end violence against women and girls, human rights programming for refugees and migrants (including when they are victims of human trafficking), and human rights provision in the context of peacekeeping operations.

In 2021, four donors together contributed to over half of DAC spending on human rights in developing countries: the EU (14.9%), the United States (14.4%), Sweden (14.3%) and Germany (8.3%). The ODA contributions of non-DAC providers towards the objective of human rights grew significantly in 2021 but remained comparatively very small in comparison to DAC providers. Nor were multilateral actors prominent donors for human rights, excluding the EU. The extent to which DAC members prioritise support to human rights within their own policies can be gauged by identifying the providers that allocate the largest portion of their own peace ODA to the sector. They include Denmark, which allocated the highest portion of its peace ODA to the sector (21.7%), followed by Spain (21%), Norway (19.5%) and Ireland (19.4%).

**Figure 3.15. DAC members' contribution to human rights as a share of their total peace ODA (2012 - 2021)**



Source: Peace ODA is based on (OECD, 2022<sup>[19]</sup>), OECD Creditor Reporting System, <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=crs1>

### 3.16. Women's rights organizations and movements, and government institutions (purpose code 15170)

This purpose code includes support for feminist, women-led and women's rights organisations and movements, and institutions (governmental and non-governmental) at all levels to enhance their effectiveness, influence and sustainability. These organisations exist to bring about transformative change for gender equality and/or the rights of women and girls in developing countries.<sup>22</sup>

#### ***What contribution to peace?***

Development co-operation in this sector supports sustainable development and the SDGs, including Goal 5 (Empowerment of Women and Gender Equality), but also the United Nations Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda, including Security Council resolution 1325 and subsequent resolutions which affirm the importance of women's participation in decision-making levels at all stages of conflict prevention, resolution and peace processes. Women are important peacebuilders, though the effects of conflict disproportionately affect them. Given that gender informs the power relationships and divisions that drive peace or conflict, inclusive policies which promote women's empowerment, support equal opportunities and women's voice and participation can contribute to peacebuilding and state-building goals (Harcourt, 2009<sup>[112]</sup>) (El-Bushra, 2012<sup>[113]</sup>).

Specifically, women-led networks can play productive roles in peace negotiations and wider peace processes. For example, research shows that the chances of reaching a peace agreement increase significantly when women exercise moderate to high degrees of influence over peace negotiations, while the durability and quality of peace agreements increases when women are included in formal peace negotiations (True and Riveros-Morales, 2019<sup>[114]</sup>; O'Reilly, Ó Súilleabháin and Paffenholz, 2015<sup>[115]</sup>). Women's movements are adept at addressing issues of collective identity and can play a key role within

<sup>22</sup> Their activities include agenda-setting, advocacy, policy dialogue, capacity development, awareness raising and prevention, service provision, conflict-prevention and peacebuilding, research, organising, and alliance and network building.

peace infrastructures, including as peace ambassadors as exemplified in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda and Nepal (Giessmann, 2016, p. 18<sup>[116]</sup>). Moreover, when women participate in elite peace processes and when their representation in national parliaments and women's civil society participation increases, peace agreements are significantly more likely to have gender provisions (which, if implemented, can have major preventive and peace-positive impacts in post-conflict societies) (Lee-Koo and True, 2018<sup>[117]</sup>). Relatedly, increasing female representation in the levers of political power in the aftermath of civil war is shown to reduce the likelihood of conflict relapse (Demeritt, Nichols and Kelly, 2014<sup>[118]</sup>; Shair-Rosenfield and Wood, 2017<sup>[119]</sup>).

Women-led organisations are also important advocates for better legal and justice systems in their countries and in supporting women and girls affected by violence in communities. Important advances are made in the rebuilding of institutions and legal frameworks where women have participated in post-conflict negotiations and decision-making structures (Domingo et al., 2013<sup>[120]</sup>). Activities centred on reconciliation, conflict mediation, inclusivity, economic development, education, awareness raising and prevention and transitional justice can build bridges between local and central government, and help promote understanding within central government of the grievances of contested communities (UN, 2018<sup>[121]</sup>; Bennet et al., 2022, p. 39<sup>[40]</sup>).

Conversely, failing to recognise and address gendered dynamics (including unequal power relations) risks undermining reconstruction and state-building efforts, as well as future peace-building efforts and gains. Given the exacerbated gender inequalities and discrimination which contribute to poverty, instability and fragility, the failure to address gender inequalities in policy and programming in fragile states is likely to undermine the effectiveness of strategies to achieve stabilisation, positive peace and development (Bennet et al., 2022<sup>[40]</sup>; Harcourt, 2009<sup>[112]</sup>).

However, when women's rights organisations and movements, and government institutions, are supported with the expectation to deliver peace results, a targeted and intentional approach is key to ensuring and demonstrating effectiveness, including by ensuring that such support is tailored towards altering the gender power dynamics and structural conditions that often prevent women's participation in peace processes.

## **Trends**

Overall, ODA for women's rights organisations and movements, and government institutions is low, especially when compared to other objectives of ODA. In 2021, official donors allocated 3.5% of their total peace ODA towards women's rights organisations and movements and government institutions in developing countries (USD 680 million) (see Figure 3.16). This volume amounts to only 0.3% of total ODA, falling short of the minimum of 1% of ODA that the UN Secretary General's New Agenda for Peace recommends donors provide in direct assistance to women's organisations, especially grass-roots groups mobilising for peace (UN, 2023, p. 20<sup>[8]</sup>). Similarly, official donors contributed only 0.3% of their total ODA for this objective to the 60 fragile contexts, allocating USD 250 million.


In 2021, five donors accounted for over half of ODA to developing countries for women's rights organisations and movements and government institutions: the Netherlands (11.9%), Sweden (11.4%), Canada (9.8%), the EU (9.7%) and the World Bank (IDA) (9.7%). Multilateral actors have consistently been a prominent donor for this sector: 11 multilateral actors together allocated 24.5% of the total ODA for women's rights organisations and movements in 2021, of which the EU and World Bank (IDA) contributed the majority. Although the number of non-DAC providers allocating ODA to this field grew significantly in 2021,<sup>23</sup> their contributions were all less than USD 1 million with the exception of the United Arab Emirates, which allocated USD 9.54 million to the sector, and ranked 24<sup>th</sup> among 170 countries in the 2021/22 Women Peace and Security Index (GIWPS and PRIO, 2021<sup>[122]</sup>).

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<sup>23</sup> 11 non-DAC providers allocated ODA to this sector in 2021.

The extent to which DAC members prioritise support to women’s rights organisations and movements and government institutions within their own policies can be gauged by identifying the providers that allocate the largest portion of their own peace ODA to the sector. They include Iceland, which allocated the highest portion of its peace ODA to the sector (58.2%), followed by Spain (23%), Austria (22.7%) and Canada (17.6%).

**Figure 3.16. Official donors’ contribution to women’s rights organisations as a share of their total peace ODA (2012 - 2021)**



Source: Peace ODA is based on (OECD, 2022<sup>[19]</sup>), OECD Creditor Reporting System, <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=crs1>

### 3.17. Ending violence against women and girls (purpose code 15180)

This purpose code includes support to programmes designed to prevent and eliminate all forms of violence against women and girls/gender-based violence, including physical, sexual and psychological violence. Preventive interventions include efforts to empower women and girls; change attitudes, norms, and behaviour; adopt and enact legal reforms; and strengthen implementation of laws and policies on ending violence against women and girls. Other ODA-eligible activities include support for expanding access to legal assistance, psychosocial counselling, and health care; training personnel to respond more effectively to the needs of survivors; and ensuring investigation, prosecution, and punishment of perpetrators of violence.

#### **What contribution to peace?**

Violence against women and girls perpetuates and represents an extreme form of gender inequality. Gender-based violence hampers development and can be a precursor of political violence and even armed conflict (UN, 2023, p. 19<sup>[8]</sup>). For example, research finds that states characterised by higher gender inequality are more likely to experience intrastate conflict and use violence as a first response in a conflict setting, while more equal societies are less prone to use violence based on societal norms of equality and tolerance (Caprioli, 2005<sup>[123]</sup>). Moreover, countries with high levels of national violence against women and girls have been more likely to experience armed conflict than those which do not (Hudson et al., 2009<sup>[124]</sup>). As repeatedly stressed by UN Security Council resolutions on women, peace and security,<sup>24</sup> sexual

<sup>24</sup> These include UN Resolutions 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2011) and 2467 (2019).

violence significantly exacerbates situations of armed conflict and impedes the restoration of international peace and security when it is used or commissioned as a tactic of war or terrorism or as part of a widespread or systematic attack against civilians.


Violence against women and girls exacerbates conflict and hinders peacebuilding efforts as it can escalate tensions, perpetuate cycles of revenge violence, and ultimately normalise a culture of violence. Moreover, direct experiences with gender-based violence can shape women's political identities in ways that can be used in the ideological frameworks of extremist movements and insurgent groups, (Gowrinathan, 2013<sup>[125]</sup>; Gowrinathan and Cronin-Furman, 2015<sup>[126]</sup>) or that cause women to join (state and rebel) armed forces (El-Bushra and Sahl, 2005<sup>[127]</sup>). Beyond its physical and mental toll, violence against women and girls impacts human capital, curtailing their opportunity to enhance their own livelihoods and ability to contribute to the economy and society at large (OECD, 2022, p. 40<sup>[14]</sup>) – with implications for societal productivity and overall development. For these reasons, development finance for comprehensive efforts that seek to prevent and respond to gender-based violence and inequality is critical for conflict prevention, long-term state stability and peacebuilding. Support for initiatives under this sector directly support the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development which includes the elimination of all forms of violence against women and girls (target 5.2.1), the United Nations Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda, as well as Security Council Resolution 1325.

### **Trends**

ODA for ending violence against women and girls in developing countries, including fragile contexts, is gradually increasing but remains low, especially when compared to other objectives of ODA. This increase may be partly due to improved quality of reporting from donors over time, as the purpose code was formerly implemented in 2017 and applied retroactively to 2016 (OECD, 2017<sup>[17]</sup>). In 2021, official donors spent USD 675 million on ODA towards ending violence against women and girls in developing countries. This amounts to 3.5% of total peace ODA and 0.3% of their total ODA (see Figure 3.17). Donors allocated USD 323 million for the 60 fragile contexts towards the objective of ending violence against women and girls. This volume, which amounts to 4% of their total peace ODA or 0.4% of their total ODA, is the highest allocated to the sector since 2016, when data for this purpose code was first recorded.

In 2021, six donors accounted for 63% of ODA for ending violence against women and girls in developing countries: the EU contributed the largest amount (23.8%), followed by the World Bank (IDA) (10.5%), Canada (9.6%), Sweden (8.7%), the United Kingdom (5.2%), and Norway (5.2%). Almost 40% of total ODA for this code in 2021 is derived from multilateral actors – of which the majority is contributed by the EU and World Bank (IDA). Additionally, while the number of non-DAC providers allocating ODA to this field has steadily grown, their contributions were all less than USD 2 million in 2021. The extent to which DAC members prioritise support to ending violence against women and girls within their own policies can be gauged by identifying the providers that allocate the largest portion of their own peace ODA to the sector. They include Ireland, which allocated the highest portion of its peace ODA to the sector (23.1%), followed by Luxembourg (17.2%), Canada (17.2%) and Spain (16.9%).

**Figure 3.17. Official donors' contribution to ending violence against women and girls as a share of their total peace ODA (2012 - 2021)**



Source: Peace ODA is based on (OECD, 2022<sup>[19]</sup>), OECD Creditor Reporting System, <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=crs1>

### 3.18. Facilitation of orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility (purpose code 15190)

This purpose code covers a range of capacity-building activities for developing countries relevant to strategy, policy development, analysis, planning and management in the areas of migration and mobility. Relevant activities include support to facilitating safe and regular migration and address irregular migration, enhancing the development impact of remittances, and improving migrant labour recruitment systems, as well as assisting the safe, dignified, informed and voluntary return of migrants from another developing country and their sustainable reintegration in their country of origin.

Secondly, it covers capacity building of developing countries to deter, prevent and fight migrant smuggling or trafficking in humans when aimed at protecting migrants against abuses. It also covers efforts to ensure access to justice and assistance for displaced persons; and support for strategies to ensure international protection and the right to asylum. However, programmes that seek to address the root causes of forced displacement and irregular migration or that focus on the humanitarian aspects of assistance to refugees and IDPs are coded separately.

#### ***What contribution to peace?***

For definitions and exclusions related to tracking development financing for migrants and IDP situations, the term migrant refers to people who choose to move across international borders for reasons other than direct threat of persecution, serious harm or death. Displaced persons, on the other hand, including refugees and internally displaced persons, have been forced or obliged to flee from their home due to the direct threat of persecution, serious harm or death and are in search of protection.

*With a labour market perspective, safe and orderly migration benefits both host and origin countries*

Facilitating orderly, safe, regular, and responsible migration can contribute to stability and wider peace outcomes by helping to alleviate pressure on local systems and resources, increasing economic and social integration opportunities for migrants and addressing social cohesion by improving conflicting relationships between different groups in transit, and mitigating against irregular onward movements such as through

people trafficking and smuggling. Likewise, given that a scarcity of equal economic opportunities can trigger grievances and lead to conflict, support for improving migrant labour recruitment systems can contribute to conflict prevention and peace outcomes. Activities supporting the effective integration of migrants and forcibly displaced persons in formal labour markets can plug labour market gaps, contribute to the development trajectory of host communities and countries, and to domestic resource mobilisation. Through remittances, migrants also contribute to the development and stability of their origin country.

#### *Sustainable and safe voluntary return and reintegration supports durable solutions*

Supporting the informed, voluntary return and sustainable reintegration of migrants in their country of origin is equally important for peace outcomes because migrants often face high levels of social exclusion on their return, which is associated with a set of factors that could increase vulnerability to radicalisation (Norland, 2016<sup>[128]</sup>). Similarly, if returnees lack security, economic opportunities or access to essential public services, for example, this can cause secondary migration or displacement, can force them to engage economically with insurgents or put them at risk of joining combatants, or to engage in other negative or exploitative coping strategies (Sydney and Preeti, 2021<sup>[129]</sup>; Crisis Group, 2023, p. 17<sup>[130]</sup>). In this sense, peace is a pre-condition, and peace ODA an essential enabler for the safe, dignified, informed and voluntary return and sustainable integration of migrants, refugees and internally displaced persons. Additionally, facilitating the participation of the forcibly displaced in peace processes can be important, depending on context, and inclusion of clauses relating to the displaced in peace agreements.

#### *Combating people smuggling and trafficking*

There are also links between peace and security and strengthening transnational responses to prevent and combat migrant smuggling and human trafficking. Specifically, recent research highlights the connections between armed groups and migrant smuggling, notably in the Sahel. Akin to their engagement in other illicit activities, armed groups often extract money from migrant smuggling activity through their control of territory, including by imposing fees on passage or by providing paid escorts (UNODC, 2023, p. 7<sup>[131]</sup>) – which can, in turn, strengthen their control and make them increasingly more violent and challenging to neutralise.

#### *Social cohesion and reducing the intensity of fragility*

Development co-operation that addresses the impacts on fragility and the well-being of the displaced themselves is important for preventing conflict and peacebuilding. Facilitating access to justice and security, property, economic self-reliance and other aspects of IDP welfare can contribute to fostering social cohesion and trust at the local level, which is important for the stability of host and origin countries. This support is particularly important given that the presence of displaced populations can increase pre-existing social fragilities in host contexts that heighten the risk of conflict onset, such as ethnic fragmentation and political exclusion. Other research highlights that insufficient support for the conditions of displaced people leads to their disenfranchisement and increases their susceptibility to extremist recruitment (Demuyneck, 2022, pp. 10-11<sup>[132]</sup>). The conditions and prospects faced by IDPs are important indicators of whether peace will take root and development will occur, as summarised by Erin Mooney (Mooney, 2013<sup>[133]</sup>).

However, a sudden, displaced influx may also exacerbate economic fragilities as it can “increase demand [in a host community], while supply may take time to adjust” (World Bank, 2017<sup>[134]</sup>). This disruption to the supply-demand equilibrium can exacerbate inequality and spur further grievances – notably within the low-wealth segments of the host community – which may affect social cohesion (Ludolph, Šedová and Talevi, 2022<sup>[135]</sup>). Large population movements contribute to volatility, with stretched services and access to livelihoods negotiated through social structures hardened through war time (Shahbaz et al., 2017<sup>[136]</sup>). As such, peace-oriented development co-operation should be inclusive and address both displaced and host communities – including by combining access to justice, assistance and protection of IDPs with approaches that seek to alleviate the adverse economic effects of vulnerable segments of host


communities. Poorly managed migration and displacement situations can exacerbate pre-existing fragilities (Araya, 2013<sup>[137]</sup>), so integrating conflict sensitivity into migration and forced displacement policies is essential to build their potential for conflict prevention and resolution.

### Trends

'Facilitation of orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration' was first implemented as a new DAC purpose code in 2018 reporting on 2017 flows, (OECD, 2018<sup>[18]</sup>) and relevant ODA-eligible activities were further clarified in 2022 (OECD, 2022<sup>[138]</sup>). ODA for this objective in fragile contexts and developing countries is increasing since 2017, notwithstanding a small dip from 2020 to 2021, which corresponds with a consistent rise in the number of global refugees since 2017 (UNHCR, 2023<sup>[139]</sup>).<sup>25</sup> The increasing volume of ODA towards the objective since 2017 also aligns with an expansion of the donor base, including both DAC and non-DAC providers, likely related to the implementation of the DAC purpose code for ODA-eligible migration activities in 2018. In 2021, global ODA towards the objective of facilitating orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility in developing countries amounted to USD 935 million. This volume amounts to 4.9% of total peace ODA and 0.4% of their total ODA (see Figure 3.18). Official donors allocated USD 224 million to the same objective in the 60 fragile contexts – a record high in volume – amounting to 2.7% of global spending on peace ODA in or 0.3% of total ODA in such contexts.

In 2021, four official donors accounted for over two thirds of global ODA for the facilitation of orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility: the EU contributed 29.1%, the Netherlands contributed 19.9%, Germany contributed 13.5% and Switzerland contributed 9.9%. Multilateral actors are also increasingly prominent donors for this sector, accounting for 33% of total ODA for the sector in 2021. The extent to which DAC members prioritise support to facilitation of orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility within their own policies can be gauged by identifying the providers that allocate the largest portion of their own peace ODA to the sector. They include Italy, which allocated the highest portion of its peace ODA to the sector (42.3%), followed by Poland (39.9%), the Netherlands (23.1%) and the Czech Republic (20.9%).

**Figure 3.18. Official donors' contribution to the facilitation of orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility as a share of their total peace ODA (2017 - 2021)**



Source: Peace ODA is based on (OECD, 2022<sup>[19]</sup>), OECD Creditor Reporting System, <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=crs1>

<sup>25</sup> For example, in 2017, the number of global refugees reported under UNHCR's mandate was 25.3 million. This number has increased each year since then to a record high of 27.1 million in 2021. This number of refugees is more than double the number a decade ago (10.5 million).

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